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At the end of each coding form of the computerized data protocol coders can provide 
uncertainty judgments about their coding and make further comments. The printed version of 
the data protocol reminds coders that it is possible to make uncertainty judgments in the 
UNCERTAINTY-field and to provide comments in the COMMENT-field. 
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PRECODING AGREEMENT 
The International Regimes Database (IRD) is a computerized information system 
containing a wide variety of information on a continuously growing set of international 
regimes. The database is a research tool intended, in the first instance, for use by social 
scientists seeking to expand knowledge regarding the formation, effectiveness, and dynamics 
of regimes. The value of this knowledge to practitioners responsible for establishing and 
operating specific regimes should also be substantial. 
Database Architecture 
The IRD data protocol contains four principal sections. Each section covers a 
grouping of variables that address a major area of interest to students of international 
regimes. The adoption of this structure is intended to facilitate the efforts of both coders and 
users. But users of the database can draw on variables located in different sections of the 
database in framing hypotheses to be explored on the basis of information contained in the 
IRD. 
The first section of the data protocol deals with regime formation and places primary 
emphasis on understanding the forces at work (e.g., power, interests, ideas) in efforts to form 
new regimes. This emphasis on origins is understandable not only in light of the remarkable 
growth in the number and variety of regimes operative at the international level during the 
recent past but also in light of the conflicts and difficulties involved with long negotiation 
processes and deadlocks or even failures of regime building efforts. Regime formation, a 
subject that encompasses the reformation of existing institutional arrangements as well as the 
creation of new institutions where none has previously existed, has emerged as one of the 
central concerns of the "new institutionalism" in international relations. 
The second section focuses on regime attributes and asks for data on principles, 
norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs of regimes. This section will yield 
an inventory of each regime's principal regulative, procedural, and programmatic elements. 
Regime analysts may use data on regime attributes to assess both the performance and the 
evolution of regimes. Policy-makers will be able to use quantitative data on regime attributes, 
such as compliance mechanisms, programmatic activities, decision rules, dispute settlement 
procedures, or organizational arrangements, to design effective international institutions. 
Regime analysts will also be able to comprehend changes in the attributes of regimes over 
time and to understand the evolution of attributes within individual regime components. 
The third section on regime consequences contains variables dealing with domestic 
and international effects of regimes. Coders will be asked to provide data about the "real 
world" effects of regimes at the international and the national level. This section starts with 
the outputs of a regime, including activities involved in operationalizing the regime's 
provisions and decision-making procedures and the first official steps required to translate a 
regime's provisions from paper to practice. It then moves to data about outcomes at both the 
international and the domestic level including such variables as: what aims states formulated 
for problem-solving and goal-attainment in connection with the regime, compliance by 
member states, activities of major agencies, and actions of those affected by the regime's 
rules. The section also focuses on the impacts of a regime including both issue specific and 
broader results produced by the regime's operation. Such results encompass the regime's 
contribution to solving the problem(s) that motivated the parties to create it, the regime's 
contribution to learning about the nature of the problem as well as impacts on the distribution 
of values arising from the regime's activities. 
The fourth section deals with matters of regime dynamics that are not captured in the 
first and third sections. Because the sections on regime formation and effectiveness allow 
coders to answer the same questions for the periods before and after fundamental changes 
(we call them watershed changes) in regimes, data pertaining to some aspects of institutional 
dynamics are included in these sections. As a result, section four is shorter than the other 
sections. But it does include data on a number of matters (e.g. shifts in the behavior of regime 
members toward the regime, resilience of the regime when confronted with new challenges) 
that are required to answer some important questions about the operations of international 
regimes. 
Precodin~ Questions 
To afford maximum comparability among cases included in the database, we are 
asking you to complete a precoding agreement in consultation with members of the database 
management team. Among other things, this procedure will permit us to customize the 
computerized database protocol to suit the specific features of your case. 
The case or unit of analysis for the International Regimes Database is the individual 
regime. A regime is a social institution consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, 
decision-making procedures, and programs that govern the interactions of actors in a specific 
issue area. The scope of an issue area is subjectively defined, mainly on the basis of the 
perceptions of decision-makers and the organization of governmental structures within 
participating states. Regimes are social practices that may encompass both a number of 
explicit agreements and a variety of informal understandings that produce varying degrees of 
convergence of expectations regarding the behavior of regime members. As such, regimes 
have temporal boundaries in the sense of starting points and, in some cases, end points. 
To reach agreement on the analytic structure of an individual case, it is necessary to 
identify: (1) the problem(s) to which the regime constitutes a response, (2) the external 
boundaries of the regime or, in other words, what is part of the regime and what is external to 
it or what constitutes the environment in which it operates, (3) the internal boundaries of the 
regime, including discrete components of the regime itself and the temporal structure of the 
regime, and (4) the most important actors in the regime's issue area. 
Although it is not strictly a questionnaire, this precoding agreement is framed as a 
series of questions. You should treat them as the basis for a dialogue between yourself and 
members of the database team. Please draft initial responses to the questions and forward 
them to the database manager by email or fax. If any question is unclear to you, please 
contact us right away. Once the precoding agreement is finalized, the database manager will 
customize the electronic version of the database protocol to reflect the terms of this 
agreement for your case. Note that for purposes of this precoding agreement, the case needs 
to be outlined, not described in great detail. To keep the task of coding a case manageable, it 
is desirable to limit the number of regime components as much as possible and to aggregate 
the important actors as far as possible. 
1. THE PROBLEM 
International regimes are generally problem driven in the sense that they come into 
existence to solve or manage problems (e.g. jurisdictional conflicts, transboundary fluxes of 
pollutants, health hazards) that individual countries are unable to cope with on their own. Yet 
there is often considerable scope for interpretation in framing these problems; participants do 
not always agree with each other regarding the nature of the problem, and specific regimes 
can deal with more than one subproblem at the same time. 
1.1. Problem Definition: What problem stimulated participating actors to form the 
regime? If possible, describe the problem in terms of activities causing the problem or in 
terms of costs - of any kind - attributable to the problem. If it is hard to answer this question 
unambiguously, describe two or more problems underlying the regime and specify whether 
these are subproblems representing distinct elements of the issue area or alternative ways of 
framing the problem on the part of different actors. Identify only those subproblems or 
alternative formulations that are consequential for regime formation, design, or effectiveness. 
Examples: The regime dealing with trade in chemicals and pesticides illustrates the 
case of subproblems. It covers two subproblems, one pertaining to public health and the other 
dealing with the harmonization of international trade. The Baltic Sea regime, by contrast, 
illustrates the case of differing perceptions of the problem, since some participants framed 
the problem as one of marine pollution while others saw it as a matter of finding a vehicle for 
demonstrating the possibility of East-West cooperation. 
Notes. Question 1.1 pertains to the period of regime formation. You will be able to 
deal with subsequent changes in the nature or formulation of the problem at a later stage in 
the coding of your case. Also, do not finalize your answer to this question before you have 
considered question 3.1. 
2. EXTERNAL REGIME BOUNDARIES 
Although regime formation is not an instantaneous process, it is useful for purposes 
of analysis to specify a temporal starting point for each case included in the database. Many 
regimes operate on an ongoing basis. But international regimes can go out of existence. 
When this happens, we want to specify a termination point for the regime. In addition to 
these temporal boundaries, it is important to specify the substantive boundaries of regimes in 
the sense of differentiating between elements of the regime itself and features of the 
surrounding environment. Normally this involves identifying the regime's constitutive 
elements, whether these are formal agreements or informal understandings. 
2.1. Renime Formation: When did regime formation occur in your case? Is there 
more than one plausible starting date for this case? If so, please provide a short account of the 
relative merits of each possible starting point and indicate your preference. We normally date 
the establishment of a regime from the signing of a document (whether legally binding or 
not) in which the parties agree to the constitutive provisions of an institutional arrangement. 
2.2. Renime Termination: Did the regime cease to exist? A regime ceases to exist if 
(i) there is a temporal discontinuity in the operation of the regime and (ii) there is no 
identifiable successor (iia) or (iib) the successor involves a fundamental change in terms of 
leading actors or the definition of the problem leading to new governing principleslkey norms 
that are at odds with the old ones. Temporal discontinuity occurs when (ia) a complete 
cessation of regime activities occurs or (ib) actors no longer feel obliged to justify actions 
that contradict regime obligations or (ic) one or more essential parties abrogate the 
agreement. Specify the date and describe the nature of the termination process, taking the 
earliest indicator for regime discontinuity. 
Notes. This is a high threshold. To illustrate, the North Pacific fur seal regime came 
into existence long before World War 11, but did not operate during the war years. Because it 
was revived after the war without significant changes in leading actors or in guiding 
principles/norms, we analyze it as one regime. Similarly, despite the adoption of governing 
principles at odds with those articulated in the 1946 convention, we treat the whaling regime 
as one case because there was no discontinuity in the operation of the regime. If we have 
asked you to code a regime that strikes you as two distinct cases on the basis of these criteria, 
please contact us immediately. If your case involves significant changes that fall short of our 
criteria of regime cessation, you will have an opportunity later on to identify watershed 
changes within the regime. 
2.3. Constitutive Elements: ldentify all agreements that you regard as constitutive 
elements of the regime by name and date (i.e. when they came into existence and dates of 
major revisions), whether they are (i) legally binding agezments, or (ii) explicit agreements 
that are not legally binding (i.e. soft law), or (iii) de facto practices that are not formulated in 
any written agreement (i.e. tacit rules). Where relevant, state whether these agreements are in 
force. 
3. Internal Repime Boundaries 
We have found that it is also helpful to make distinctions among analytically 
differentiable components and temporal watersheds within the same regime. These 
distinctions are not as fundamental as those described in the preceding section; they pertain 
to differences within regimes rather than between regimes. Yet it is often necessary to make 
use of such distinctions to formulate intelligible answers to questions included in the 
database protocol. 
Many regimes encompass two or more distinct institutional arrangements - we call 
them components - that together make up the regime as a whole. Many questions included in 
the database protocol apply to individual components rather than to the overall regime. In 
some but not all cases, it is possible to identify a single component (e.g. a framework 
convention) as the regime's core with other components (e.g. substantive protocols) 
occupying positions ancillary to the core. 
Note. Because the existence of components adds substantially to the work of coding 
a case, you will want to be cautious in identifying components in your case. To guide your 
thinking, we have developed the following criteria: 
Regimes have separate components if there are (i) distinct institutional forms (e.g. 
separate treaties, protocols, annexes) and (ii) one or more of the following conditions obtains: 
(iia) the distinct forms deal with different subproblems (see above); 
(iib) they cover differentiable sources of the problem(s) (e.g. the European acid rain 
regime includes separate protocols regulating emissions of SOX, NOX, and VOCs in 
addition to its framework convention); 
(iic) these forms are aimed at different regulatory targets (e.g. the global trade regime 
encompasses different rules for trade in manufactured goods, agricultural goods, and 
services), 
(iid) they aim at different clusters of actors (e.g. the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
includes different norms and rules aimed at nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon 
states). 
(iie) these forms deal with major regime functions (e.g., compliance, funding). 
3.1. Renime Components: Does the regime have two or more components? Which of 
the agreements identified under 2.3. are applicable to each component. List by component. 
3.1.1. Component History: When did each component come into existence and 
become a part of the regime? Provide specific dates. 
3.1.2. Regime Core: Does one of these components constitute the core of the 
regime? If so, identify the core. 
A watershed, in contrast to a transition from one regime to another, marks a major 
change within a regime and divides the regime into distinct time periods. A watershed occurs 
if there is (i) a temporal discontinuity in the operation of the regime, or (ii) a significant 
restructuring of principlestkey norms (the new principles need not necessarily be at odds with 
the old ones), or (iii) a significant change in the group of leading actors, or (iv) a significant 
expansion in functional scope (e.g. a radical deepening of regulative rules). In cases 
involving watersheds, you will be asked separate questions covering the periods before and 
after the watershed change. 
3.2 Watershed Change: Did the regime experience one or more watersheds? If so, 
specify the date(s) and the major causes and circumstances. Indicate which of the criteria 
listed above are relevant to your judgment. 
3.2.1. If a watershed change occurred, was it accompanied by a change in the nature 
of the problem(s) or subproblems or in the framing of the problem(s). Explain how the 
problem(s) after the watershed differ from the problem(s) mentioned underl . l .  
4. Important Actors 
Many parts of the protocol take an actor-oriented perspective. For instance, we often 
ask about activities instead of structures in seeking to identify the causes of the problem(s). 
The problem addressed by the GATT regime, for example, is treated at the outset as a 
problem arising from the protectionist policies of states rather than as a collective-action 
problem. Similarily, we start by asking about activities leading to overfishing rather than by 
characterizing the problem as a tragedy of the commons. Later on, we ask additional 
questions dealing with structural conditions. 
In cases where there are only a few actors, it is possible to supply data on all those 
participating in the formation and operation of a regime. A growing number of cases, 
however, involve too many actors to cover exhaustively. In such cases, it is important to 
identify the most important actors for purposes of answering actor-specific questions. 
In some but not all regimes, important actors include not only states and coalitions of 
states but also non-state actors and even individuals (when their influence reaches beyond 
their role as agents of corporate actors). Note that an actor can be counted as important 
whether or not it is a member of the regime (e.g. its actions may be a major cause of the 
problem even if it does not become a regime member). Disaggregation with regard to actors 
adds to the complexity of the database protocol and should be resorted to sparingly. If stable 
coalitions are important in your case, identify them. But also identify one or two leading 
states for each coalition. 
Add a sentence or two indicating why each of these actors is important. Factors to 
consider in answering this question include: (i) major role in causing the problem(s), (ii) 
major role (potential or actual) in solving the problem(s), (iii) major role in creating the 
regime, and (iv) major role in developing strategies to implement the provisions of the 
regime. 
4.1. Important Actors: Which states, coalitions, non-state actors, or individuals do 
you regard as the most important for purposes of answering questions relating to your case 
that are actor-specific? Provide separate answers for each of the following subquestions. 
4.1.1 If applicable, identify up to five or six important states. 
4.1.2. If applicable, identify important state coalitions. Identify one or two leading 
states for each coalition. 
4.1.3. If applicable, identify up to five or six important non-state actors. 
4.1.4. If applicable, identify up to five or six important individuals. 
PART I 
Regime Formation 
PART I - TABLE OF CONTENTS 
101 THE PROBLEM 
lOlA How many nations were regarded as being important because of their role in causing the 
problem? How many were regarded as being especially important compared to others because of their 
role in causing the problem? 
lOlB How many nations were regarded as being important because of the extent to which they were 
affected by the problem? How was the damage associated with the problem shared among these 
negatively affected? 
lOlC Which of the important nations identified in the precoding agreement and which other nations 
were considered to be important because of their roles in causing the problem andlor the negative 
effects of the problem? 
lOlD Compare the set of nations especially important because of their roles in causing the problem 
with the set experiencing the bulk of the suffering. 
lOlE What current or future negative effects did or could the problem(s) have on these nations? Specify 
whether negative effects result in a loss of current welfare or in a failure to achieve gains. Distinguish 
whether these losses are currently occurring or are expected to occur in the future. Rank up to five of 
the most important effects. 
lOlF Regarding interests involved in the issue area: Did the negotiations regarding the regime deal with 
conflicts about the distribution of the costs? 
lOlG Regarding interests involved in the issue area: Was there an incentive to disobey the rules even 
after the regime was put in place? 
lOlH Regarding interests involved in the issue area: How complex was the issue area? 
1011 Regarding interests involved in the issue area: How cornpatiblelincompatible were the interests of 
the parties? 
lOlJ Regarding interests involved in the issue area: What was the degree of symmetrylasymmetry in 
terms of present versus future impacts of the problem? 
lOlK Describe the nature of the proposed solutions to the problem(s). If states had different views 
about alternative solutions, please explain. 
lOlL Did the proposed solutions appear to be difficult or easy to implement? 
lOlM What were the most important difficulties in implementing the proposed solutions? 
lOlN Does the problem involve supplying a collective good, regulating the use of a common pool 
resource, managing a shared natural resource, or controlling transboundary externalities? 
1010  Does the problem involve a conflict over values, a conflict of interest about relatively assessed 
goods, a conflict over means, or a conflict of interest about absolutely assessed goods? 
lOlP Is the problem addressed by the regime relatively self-contained or closely linked to surrounding 
issues? 
102 THE POLITICAL SETTING 
102A What broader currents of tension and hostility or friendship prevailed among the parties 
participating in regime formation? 
102B What power resources are relevant to determining the distribution of issue-specific power 
resources among the participants in regime formation? List the three most powerful states having these 
(or most of these) power resources. 
102C Were the nations involved in regime formation roughly symmetrical in terms of issue-specific 
power or did the process involve sharp differences in power resources? 
103 THE ECONOMIC SETTING 
103A What is the relative importance of the economic sectors that dominated the issue area for the 
single nations involved? Indicate importance for sectors directly or indirectly responsible for and/or 
causing the problem(s). Indicate relative importance of economic sectors for each important nation 
identified in the precoding negotiations. 
103B How were costs and benefits of efforts to solve the problem distributed among nations? 
104 THE COGNITIVE SETTING 
104A Was the nature of the problem well understood? 
104B How complete was the information about the options available for dealing with the problem? 
104C Did the parties disagree about the completeness or accuracy of information about the options? 
104D How well established was knowledge of the probable consequences of different options for 
solving the problem? 
104E Did the parties disagree about the probable consequences of selecting different options? 
104F What expert groups were present and active during the process of regime formation? 
105 STATES DURING REGIME FORMATION 
105A For each of the important states identified in the precoding agreement, indicate whether that state 
was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral. Include other states if especially noteworthy. 
105B For each of the important states identified in the precoding agreement and above, indicate 
whether that state's efforts were primarily structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial. 
105C Were the efforts of individual pushers reinforcing or conflicting? Were the efforts of individual 
laggards reinforcing or conflicting? 
106 NON-STATE ACTORS DURING REGIME FORMATION 
106A What types of non-state actors were actively involved? 
106B For each of the important non-state actors identified in the precoding agreement, indicate whether 
that non-state actor was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral. Include other non-state actors if especially 
noteworthy. 
106C For each of the non-state actors identified in the precoding agreement and above, indicate 
whether its efforts were primarily structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial. 
106D Were the efforts of individual non-state pushers reinforcing or conflicting? Were the efforts of 
individual non-state laggards reinforcing or conflicting? 
107 INDIVIDUALS DURING REGIME FORMATION 
107A For each of the important individuals identified in the precoding agreement, indicate whether that 
individual was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral. Include other individuals if especially noteworthy. 
107B For each of the individuals identified in the precoding agreement and above, indicate whether 
herlhis efforts where primarily structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial. 
107C Were the efforts of individuals who were important pushers reinforcing or conflicting? Where 
the efforts of individuals who were important laggards reinforcing or conflicting? 
108 AGENDA FORMATION 
108A When did the problem to be addressed by the regime initially make its way onto the international 
political agenda? Did the problem stay on the agenda continuously until the negotiations started? When 
was the last time the problem appeared on the agenda before the negotiations started? 
108B Which of the following factors were present durins asenda formation? Which of these factors were 
most influential for agenda formation? 
lO8C Provide a textual explanation of what caused the shift from agenda formation to explicit negotiations. 
lO8D Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by a single state or a small group of 
potential regime members? Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by potential regime 
members negotiating among themselves more or less as equals and setting the terms of the agenda 
deliberately? Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by factors largely outside deliberate 
efforts of potential regime members? 
109 NEGOTIATION STAGE 
109A Were there earlier negotiations that failed to create a regime in the issue area? If yes, when did the 
latest effort that failed start and end? 
109B When did the explicit negotiations that led to the regime start? When did they end? 
109C Under whose auspices did the negotiations take place? 
109D How many actors participated in the negotiations as official participants and observers? 
109E Were there states not participating in the negotiation process that other actors believed should have 
participated? 
109F Indicate the negotiation strategies employed by each of the important states and coalitions identified 
in the precoding agreement. Write a paragraph describing the essential nature of the strategies used during 
the negotiation phase employing the keywords checked below. 
109G Did potential signatories participate in the negotiations but fail to sign the agreement reached? 
109H What roles did non-state actors play in the negotiations? 
1091 In a short paragraph, evaluate how influential these non-state actors were during the negotiations. 
109J Were the negotiations dominated by a single state or a small group of states, by an interstate process 
among relative equals, or by transnational forces? 
1 10 OPERATIONALIZATION STAGE 
110A What steps were required for the relevant agreements to become operational? Indicate these steps for 
each agreement identified in the precoding agreement. 
1 lOB How long did it take for the relevant agreements of the regime to become operational? Provide 
information for each relevant agreement identified in the precoding agreement. 
110C Were there serious disagreements among potential regime members concerning whether to make the 
agreement(s) operational? If so, were these disagreements resolved through actions of a single state or a 
small group of states, by an interstate process among relative equals, or by transnational forces? 
110D Did the parties agree to act as if the agreement were already in force before the regime became 
operational? 
110E How severe were the domestic political battles over the terms of the agreement within member states 
during the operationalization stage? 
1 I I NARRATIVE 
11 l A  Write a short description of the central aspects of regime formation. It is acceptable to repeat 
information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded 
above. List the most important literature used in coding the regime formation part of the data protocol. 
101 THE PROBLEM 
FORM: RF1 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: lOlA How many nations were regarded as being important 
because of their role in causing the problem? How many were regarded as being especially 
important compared to others because of their role in causing the problem? 
This question deals with two different groups of nations. The overall set includes all actors 
causing the problem (e.g., a large number of nations are responsible for oil-pollution at sea). 
However, a smaller set of nations are often more important compared to the overall set of 
nations (e.g., because they emit most of the oil). The existence of a larger number of nuclear 
weapon states led to the problem of nuclear testing. However, a subset of these was more im- 
portant compared to others due to their national nuclear testing programs. 
In this document, we separate nations from states and governments. Nation is used as a 
general term standing for political administrative systems/governments and societies. State is 
used as a term standing for the political administrative system and the government. Govern- 
ment is used, when activities and attitudes of the government are affected. 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
NUMBER-CAUSERS How many nations were regarded as being important 
because of their role in causing the problem? Code each 
problem mentioned under PROBLEM above. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = 1-5 
2 = 6-15 
3 = 16-30 
4 = 31-60 
5 = 60-120 
6 = More than 120 
7 = Don't know 
NUMBER- 
SPECIAL-CAUSERS Indicate proportion of those nations mentioned under 
NUMBER-CAUSERS regarded as being especially 
important compared to others because o f  their role in 
causing the problem. Code each problem mentioned under 
PROBLEM above. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Less than 20% of problem-causing nations were mainly responsible 
2 = 20% - 40% of problem-causing nations were mainly responsible 
3 = 40% - 60% of problem-causing nations were mainly responsible 
4 = 60% - 80% of problem-causing nations were mainly responsible 
5 = Problem-causing nations were roughly evenly responsible 
6 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF2 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: lOlB How many nations were regarded as being important 
because of the extent to which they were affected by the problem? How was the damage 
associated with the problem shared among these negatively affected? 
This question deals with two different groups of nations. The overall set refers to the total 
number of actors directly affected by the problem. For example, a large number of nations 
are affected (in different ways) by oil-pollution at sea. However, a smaller set of nations 
normally are particularly important, because they are especially affected and experience the 
bulk of the suffering due to long coastal areas, tanker accidents, etc. All nations are affected 
by radioactive emissions in the atmosphere from nuclear testing. However, a smaller set of 
nations are more important compared to the larger set of nations, because they experience the 
bulk of the suffering due to their status as neighbours to nuclear testing areas. 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
NUMBER-AFFECTED How many nations were regarded as being important 
because of the extent to which they were affected by the 
problem? Code each problem mentioned under PROBLEM 
above. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = 1-5 
2 = 6-15 
3 = 16-30 
4 = 3 1-60 
5 = 60- 120 
6 = More than 120 
7 = Don't know 
NUMBER- 
DAMAGE -SHARE Indicate proportion of those nations mentioned under 
NUMBER-AFFECTED which experienced the bulk of the 
suffering. Code each problem mentioned under PROBLEM 
above. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Less than 20% of directly affected nations experienced the bulk of the suffering 
2 = 20% - 40% of directly affected nations experienced the bulk of the suffering 
3 = 40% - 60% of directly affected nations experienced the bulk of the suffering 
4 = 60% - 80% of directly affected nations experienced the bulk of the suffering 
5 = Affected nations experienced the bulk of the suffering roughly evenly 
6 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF3 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: lOlC Which of the important nations identified in the pre- 
coding agreement and which other nations were considered to be important because of their 
roles in causing the problem andtor the negative effects of the problem? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
IMPORTANT-NATION Important nationststates identified in the precoding agree- 
ment. Code each nation for each problem mentioned under 
PROBLEM (see codes above). For each problem of an 
element, list up to 10 additional nations. 
CAUSER-AFFECTED Which of the important nations identified in the precoding 
agreement and which other nations were considered to be 
important because of their roles in causing the problem 
and/or the negative effects of the problem? Code each nation 
mentioned under IMPORTANT- NATION. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Important as causer of the problem 
2 = Important because it was negatively affected by the problem 
3 = Important as causer and because it was negatively affected by the problem 
4 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF4 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: lOlD Compare the set of nations especially important because 
of their roles in causing the problem with the set experiencing the bulk of the suffering. 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
CAUSER- 
AFFECTED-COMPARE Compare the set of states especially important because of 
their roles in causing the problem with the set experiencing 
the bulk of the suffering. Provide codes for each problem 
mentioned under PROBLEM. 
0 = Not applicable 
I = No overlap at all 
2 = Identical 
3 = Mostly the same 
4 = Mostly different 
5 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF5 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: lOlE What current or future negative effects did or could the 
problem(s) have on these nations? Specify whether negative effects result in a loss of current 
welfare or in a failure to achieve gains. Distinguish whether these losses are currently 
occurring or are expected to occur in the future. Rank up to five of the most important 
effects. 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
EFFECTS Current or future negative effects the problem had or could 
have on these nations. Provide codes for each problem 
mentioned under PROBLEM. For each problem, check as 
many as apply. If relevant, mention additional effects. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Loss of economic welfare at broad aggregate level 
2 = Loss of economic welfare in specific economic sectors 
3 = Loss of economic welfare at particular subnational level 
4 = Failure to achieve gains in economic welfare at broad aggregate level 
5 = Failure to achieve gains in economic welfare in specific economic sectors 
6 = Failure to achieve gains in economic welfare at particular subnational level 
7 = Decline in public health at broad aggregate level 
8 = Decline in public health within narrow portion of population 
9 = Failure to achieve increases in public health at broad aggregate level 
10 = Failure to achieve increases in public health within narrow portion of population 
1 1  = Decline in military security at a national level (loss or threatened loss of territory; 
organized physical violence against nation) 
12 = Decline in security at subnational level (loss of territory, organized physical violence 
against group or region) 
13 = Decline in security at individual level (violence, persecution, abuse of political human 
rights) 
14 = Failure to achieve gains in military security at a national level (loss or threatened loss of 
territory; organized physical violence against nation) 
15 = Failure to achieve gains in security at subnational level (loss of territory, organized 
physical violence against group or region) 
16 = Failure to achieve gains in security at individual level (violence, persecution, abuse of 
political human rights) 
17 = Decline in population of particular flora species 
18 = Failure to achieve gains in population of particular flora species 
19 = Decline in population of particular fauna species 
20= Failure to achieve gains in population of particular fauna species 
2 1 = Decline in ecosystem health 
22 = Failure to achieve gains in ecosystem health 
23 = Decline in aesthetically valued goods (scenic vistas, historic buildings) 
24 = Failure to achieve gains in aesthetically valued goods (e.g., scenic vistas, historic 
buildings) 
25 = Abuse of animal rights (suffering or loss of life in individual non-human organisms) 
26 = Failure to achieve improvements in animal rights (alleviation of suffering or protection 
of life of individual nonhuman organisms) 
27 = Don't know 
28 = If relevant, mention additional effects 
CURRENT-FUTURE For each effect checked under EFFECTS, code whether it 
was occurring currzntly and/or expected to occur in the 
future. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Currently 
2 = In the Future 
3 = Currently and in the Future 
4 = Don't know 
EFFECTS-RANK For each problem identified in the precoding agreement, 
rank up to five of the most important effects mentioned 
under EFFECTS. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Rank one (most important rank) 
2 = Rank two (second important rank) 
3 = Rank three (third important rank) 
4 = Rank four (fourth important rank) 
5 = Rank five (fifth important rank) 
6 = Not among the top five 
7 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF'6 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: lOlF Regarding interests involved in the issue area: Did the 
negotiations regarding the regime deal with conflicts about the distribution of the costs? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
INTEREST-COSTS Did the negotiations regarding the regime deal with conflicts 
about the distribution of the costs? Provide codes for each 
problem mentioned under PROBLEM. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very strong relevance of conflicts about the distribution of costs 
2 = Strong relevance of conflicts about the distribution of costs 
3 = Medium relevance of conflicts about the distribution of costs 
4 = Low relevance of conflicts about the distribution of costs 
5 = No relevance of conflicts about the distribution of costs 
6 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF'7 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: lOlG Regarding interests involved in the issue area: Was there 
an incentive to disobey the rules even after the regime was put in place? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
INTEREST-DISOBEY Was there an incentive to disobey the rules even after the 
regime was put in place? Provide codes for each problem 
mentioned under PROBLEM. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very strong relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place 
2 = Strong relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place 
3 = Medium relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place 
4 = Low relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place 
5 = No relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place 
6 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF'8 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: lOlH Regarding interests involved in the issue area: How 
complex was the issue area? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
INTEREST- 
COMPLEXITY How complex was the issue area? Draw your judgement on 
the following items: 1= Number of single issues to be 
regulated; 2 = Number of states involved; 3 = Number of 
different state interests; 4 = Implications of regulations in a 
single issue area for other issue areas. Provide codes for each 
problem mentioned under PROBLEM. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very strong relevance of complexity in the issue area 
2 = Strong relevance of complexity in the issue area 
3 = Medium relevance of complexity in the issue area 
4 = Low relevance of complexity in the issue area 
5 = No relevance of complexity in the issue area 
6 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF9 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 1011 Regarding interests involved in the issue area: How 
compatible/incompatible were the interests of the parties? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
INTEREST- 
INCOMPATIBILITY How compatible/incompatible were the interests of the 
parties? Provide codes for each problem mentioned under 
PROBLEM. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very strong incompatibility of interests 
2 = Strong incompatibility of interests 
3 = Minor incompatibility of interests 
4 = Minor compatibility of interests 
5 = Strong compatibility of interests 
6 = Very strong compatibility of interests 
7 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RFlO 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: lOlJ Regarding interests involved in the issue area: What was 
the degree of symmetry/asymmetry in terms of present versus future impacts of the problem? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
INTEREST-ASYMMETRY What was the degree of symmetry/asymmetry in terms of 
present versus future impacts of the problem? Provide codes 
for each problem mentioned under PROBLEM. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very strong asymmetry in terms of present versus future impacts 
2 = Strong asymmetry in terms of present versus future impacts 
3 = Minor asymmetry in terms of present versus future impacts 
4 = Minor symmetry in terms of present versus future impacts 
5 = Strong symmetry in terms of present versus future impacts 
6 = Very strong symmetry in terms of present versus future impacts 
7 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RFl l  
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: lOlK Describe the nature of the proposed solutions to the 
problem(s). If states had different views about alternative solutions, please explain. 
If applicable, provide information for each element. Consider that the nature of proposed 
solution(s) to the problem(s) can change over time. If a problem occurs within more than a 
single element of a regime, indicate the nature of proposed solution(s) to the problem(s) for 
each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
NARRATIVE-SOLUTIONS Describe the nature of the proposed solutions to the 
problem(s). If states had different views about alternative 
solutions, please explain. For each problem mentioned under 
PROBLEM, provide textual information. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF12 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: lOlL Did the proposed solutions appear to be difficult or easy 
to implement? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
SOLUTIONS-IMPLEMENT Did the proposed solutions appear to be difficult or easy to 
implement? Provide codes for each problem mentioned 
under PROBLEM. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very difficult: Some or all of the following difficulties occurred; 1 = Proposed solutions 
were cost-intensive; 2 = Financial/technological capabilities were not available; 3 = 
Solutions involved many different sectors within domestic societies and/or affected a 
significant portion of domestic populations; 4 = Solutions included new policies not 
implemented before; 5 = Domestic interest groups had negative views about implementation. 
2 = Difficult: Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3 = Balanced: Some implementation problems were present, but were far less pronounced. 
4 = Relatively easy: Between 3 and 5 on the scale. 
5 = Easy: No implementation problems occurred. 
6 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF13 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: lOlM What were the most important difficulties in 
implementing the proposed solutions? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
IMPLEMENT-DIFFICULT What were the most important difficulties in implementing 
the proposed solutions? Provide codes for each problem 
mentioned under PROBLEM. For each problem, check as 
many as apply. If applicable, mention additional difficulties. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Great interference in social life 
2 = High public sector costs 
3 = High private sector costs 
4 = Low domestic capacities 
5 = Resistance from negatively affected interest-groups 
6 = High political costs for single national governments (e.g., loss of electoral support) 
7 = High public resistance in the mass media against proposed solutions 
8 = Resistance from government agencies and administrations 
9 = Proposed solutions contradicted with traditional domestic policies and or regulations 
10 = Less or no experience with implementation of proposed solutions 
11 = Don't know 
12 = If applicable, mention additional difficulties 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF14 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: lOlN Does the problem involve supplying a collective good, 
regulating the use of a common pool resource, managing a shared natural resource, or 
controlling transboundary externalities? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
GOOD-TYPE Does the problem involve supplying a collective good, re- 
gulating the use of a common pool resource, managing a 
shared natural resource, or controlling transboundary 
externalities? Provide codes for each problem mentioned 
under PROBLEM. 
0 = None of the types 
1 = Collective (or public) good 
2 = Common pool resource 
3 = Shared natural resource 
4 = Common pool resource and shared natural resource 
5 = Transboundary externalities 
6 = Don't know 
1 = Collective (or public) good: No one can be excluded from the use of the good. Even if some 
actors try to define rules for the use of the collective good, actors outside such a rule system can 
behave as free riders without complying with such rules. In contrast to a common pool resource, 
it is difficult to subtract one actor's use of a collective good from the shares of other users. 
Collective goods and common pool resources are mutually exclusive categories. 
2 = Common pool resource: Similar to a collective good other actors cannot be excluded from 
the use of a common pool resource and free riding by other actors is possible. A common pool 
resource makes it possible to subtract the use of one actor from the use of others (e.g., limited 
number of slots in the geostationary orbit). Therefore, it is necessary to determine the resource 
unit, such as an acre-foot of water for a ground water basin, tons of fish for fishing grounds, or 
processing time for computer facilities. Common pool resources can be renewable (like fish 
stocks) or exhaustible (like nonrenewable resources). 
3 = Shared natural resource: Shared natural resources extend into or across jurisdictions of two 
or more states. They may involve renewable or nonrenewable resources. Shared natural 
resource may be common pool resources. Therefore, these two types are not mutually 
exclusive. However, not all common pool resources are shared natural resources. 
4 = Common pool resource and shared natural resource (see explanations above) 
5 = Transboundary externalities: The control of transboundary externalities .refers to problems 
where one country is the victim of another country's externalization of a certain problem ( e.g., 
pollution: downstream countries as victims of upstream countries; transboundary export of 
hazardous wastes). Transboundary externalities often give rise to asymmetries between victims 
and perpetrators. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF15 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 1010 Does the problem involve a conflict over values, a 
conflict of interest about relatively assessed goods, a conflict over means, or a conflict of 
interest about absolutely assessed goods? 
These four types are based on the distinction between consensual and nonconsensual conflicts. 
In nonconsensual conflicts actors disagree on what is desirable for all of them collectively. 
Conflicts about values and conflicts about means are nonconsensual conflicts. In consensual 
conflicts actors are confronted with a situation of scarcity. Therefore, every actor desires the 
same valued object but cannot achieve full satisfaction because there is not enough for 
everybody. Conflicts of interests about relatively assessed goods and conflicts of interests about 
absolutely assessed goods are consensual conflicts. 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
CONFLICT-TYPE Does the problem involve a conflict over values, a conflict 
of interest about relatively assessed goods, a conflict over 
means, or a conflict of interest about absolutely assessed 
goods? Provide codes for each problem mentioned under 
PROBLEM. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Conflict about values: A disagreement about values (conflict over values) occurs when the 
actors disagree fundamentally on the achievement of a certain aim (e.g., conflict about whether 
protection of human rights is an important issue, conflict about acknowledgement that there is a 
need for cooperation to protect a certain environmental good). 
2 = Conflict about relatively assessed goods: A conflict over relatively assessed goods occurs 
when actors assess the achievement of values in the issue area in relation to the values achieved 
by other actors (e.g., with regard to weapons within negotiations on arms reduction; when the 
relative gains problem is the prevailing feature in economic negotiations). 
3 = Conflict about means: A disagreement about means (conflict over means) occurs when the 
actors disagree on the means for achieving an aim (e.g., conflict about certain policies for 
achieving the realization of human rights or protection of an environmental good). 
4 = Conflict about absolutely assessed goods: Such conflicts refer to objects that cannot be 
considered in relative terms and can only be assessed absolutely. Goods obtain their value for 
actors independent of what other actors have (e.g., food or health). 
5 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF16 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: lOlP Is the problem addressed by the regime relatively self- 
contained or closely linked to surrounding issues? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
PROBLEM-LINKED Is the problem addressed by the regime relatively self- 
contained or closely linked to surrounding issues? Provide 
codes for each problem mentioned under PROBLEM. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Self-contained 
2 = Loosely linked to surrounding issues 
3 = Linked to surrounding issues closely 
4 = Don't know 
NARRATIVE- 
PROBLEM-LINKED If PROBLEM-LINKED is coded '2' (=loosely linked to 
surrounding issues) or '3' (= linked to surrounding issues 
closely), explain in which ways the issues are linked. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
102 THE POLITICAL SETTING 
FORM: RF17 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 102A What broader currents of tension and hostility or 
friendship prevailed among the parties participating in regime formation? 
Provide codes for each element. 
POWER- 
SETTINGTENSION What broader currents of tension and hostility or friendship 
prevailed among the parties participating in regime 
formation? 
1 = Very intense tensionlhostility: Violent conflict among major parties can not be excluded 
and fundamental conflicts determine the overall relationship among states (e.g., USA-Soviet 
relationship in 1955 to Cold War). 
2 = Intense tensionlhostility: Although violent conflict among major parties is not likely, 
fundamental conflicts determine the overall relationship among states (e.g., USA-Soviet 
relationship 1979 to Afghanistan crisis). 
3 = Moderate tensionlhostility: Occasional severe conflicts are resolved by non-violent 
means as a consequence of either state attitudes or the prevailing political framework 
[membership in military alliances] (e.g., disputes between Turkey and Greece; USA-Russia 
after dissolution of former Soviet Union). 
4 = Friendliness but occasional conflicts: State relationships are generally friendly and 
established in a context of growing or strong interdependence. Occasional conflicts may be 
severe but are generally settled by diplornaticlpolitical means (e.g., present relationship 
between USA-Japan). 
5 = General friendliness: State relationships were generally friendly and were established in a 
context of strong interdependence. Normally states try to avoid severe conflicts (e.g., present 
relationships between USA-Canada, Germany-France). 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RFl8 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 102B What power resources are relevant to determining the 
distribution of issue-specific power resources among the participants in regime formation? 
List the three most powerful states having these (or most of these) power resources. 
Issue-specific power can be thought of as an actor's ability to get others to do something they 
otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost for the actor). This question aims at 
identifying a broad range of power resources, which are not confined to structural power. Thus, 
negotiation skills can constitute an important power resource. 
Provide codes for each element. 
POWER- 
RESOURCES-LIST What power resources are relevant to determining the 
distribution of issue-specific power resources among the 
participants in regime formation? Elaborate, if necessary. 
POWER- 
RESOURCES-NATIONS For each element, list the three most powerful nations 
having these (or most of these) power resources. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF19 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 102C Were the nations involved in regime formation roughly 
symmetrical in terms of issue-specific power or did the process involve sharp differences in 
power resources? 
Provide codes for each element. 
POWER- 
SETTING-SYMMETRY Were the nations involved in regime formation roughly 
symmetrical in terms of issue-specific power or did the 
process involve sharp differences in power resources? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Completely even distribution: Issue-specific power resources are evenly distributed 
among nations. 
2 = Slightly uneven distribution: Besides slightly uneven distribution, no single nation has a 
greater ability to get other nations to do something they otherwise would not do. 
3 = Considerable unevenness: Uneven distribution of power resources can lead to more 
powerful actors being able to get other nations to do something they otherwise would not do 
with regard to a limited number of issues in the issue area. 
4 = Highly uneven distribution: Very uneven distribution of power resources can lead to 
more powerful actors being able to get other nations to do something they otherwise would 
not do with regard to a significant number of issues in the issue area. 
5 = Issue-specific hegemon present: One single actor can get all other actors to do things that 
they otherwise would not do with regard to nearly all issues at stake in the issue area. 
6 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
103 THE ECONOMIC SETTING 
FORM: RF20 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 103A What is the relative importance of the economic sectors 
that dominated the issue area for the single nations involved? Indicate importance for sectors 
directly or indirectly responsible for and/or causing the problem(s). Indicate relative 
importance of economic sectors for each important nation identified in the precoding 
negotiations. 
Provide codes for each element. 
ECONOMIC- 
SECTORS-CAUSERS What is the relative importance of the economic sectors that 
dominated the issue area for the single nations involved? 
Indicate importance for sectors directly or indirectly re- 
sponsible for and/or causing the problem(s). Indicate relative 
importance of economic sectors for each important nation 
listed under IMPORTANT-NATION. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = No economic significance: Contribution of these sectors to national GDP or number of 
employees of the sectors was insignificant (turnover or number of employees in sectors less 
than 0.1 % of GDP or domestic employees). 
2 = Low economic significance: Between no and medium economic significance (turnover or 
number of employees in sectors between 0.1 and 1 %  of GDP or domestic employees). 
3 = Medium economic significance: Contribution of these sectors to national GDP or number 
of employees of the sectors matter (turnover or number of employees in sectors between 1 
and 5 % of GDP or domestic employees). 
4 = High economic significance: Between medium and very high economic significance 
(turnover or number of employees in sectors between 5 and 10% of GDP or domestic 
employees). 
5 = Very high economic significance: Sectors represent key industries or together contribute 
a major part of national GDP (turnover or number of employees in sectors more than 10% of 
GDP or domestic employees). 
6 = Don't know 
IMPORTANT-NATION Important Nations/states identified in the precoding 
agreement. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF21 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 103B How were costs and benefits of efforts to solve the 
problem distributed among nations? 
Provide information for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
NARRATIVE-COSTS How were costs of efforts to solve the problem distributed 
among nations? For each problem, please elaborate. Draw on 
the following items; add additional information, if 
applicable: 1 = Were costs concentrated in one or a few 
nations or were they widely distributed? 2 = Was 
distribution of costs among nations symmetrical or 
asymmetrical? 3 = Were there changes in the distribution of 
costs over the time? 4 = Additional information. 
NARRATIVE-BENEFITS How were benefits of efforts to solve the problem distributed 
among nations? For each problem, please elaborate. Draw on 
the following items; add additional information, if 
applicable. 1 = Were benefits concentrated in one or a few 
nations or were they widely distributed? 2 = Was 
distribution of benefits among nations symmetrical or 
asymmetrical? 3 = Were there changes in the distribution of 
benefits over the time? 4 = Additional information. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
104 THE COGNITIVE SETTING 
FORM: RF22 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 104A Was the nature of the problem well understood? 
The degree of uncertainty in an issue area depends on consensus regarding the nature, causes, 
and consequences of the problem, and on consensus about solutions and what should be 
maximized in the issue area (e.g., whether the actors value protecting fish resources or 
harvesting a resource to provide food). 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
PROBLEM-UNDERSTAND Was the nature of the problem well understood? Provide 
codes for each problem mentioned under PROBLEM. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very strongly established understanding: There was general consensus regarding nature, 
causes, and consequences of the problem, as well as regarding solutions and what should be 
maximized in the issue area. 
2 = Strongly established understanding: Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3 = Partially established understanding: Consensus was partially achieved, either by 
consensus on some but not all of the different variables (nature, causes, and consequences of 
the problem as well as solutions and what should be maximized in the issue area) or by 
generally growing, but still not fully developed, consensus on all of the different variables. 
4 = Low established understanding: Between 3 and 5 on the scale. 
5 = Not at all established: Understanding was not established with regard to nature, causes, 
and consequences of the problem, or to solutions or what should be maximized in the issue 
area. 
6 = Don't know. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF23 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 104B How complete was the information about the options 
available for dealing with the problem? 
Options for tackling a problem may focus on measures taken within different sectors. 
Options for tackling an international problem are based on information about the variables 
most important for solving the problem. 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
INFORMATION- 
OPTIONS-PROBLEM How complete was the information about the options 
available for dealing with the problem? Provide codes for 
each problem mentioned under PROBLEM. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very high completeness: All necessary information on the different options was 
available. 
2 = Medium completeness: Despite the availability of information on available options there 
was still a lack of certain kinds of information for some or all options. 
3 = Low completeness: Information on most of the possible options was not available and 
even the options themselves may not all have been identified. 
4 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF24 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 104C Did the parties disagree about the completeness or 
accuracy of information about the options? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
INFORMATION- 
OPTIONS-DIS AGREE Did the parties disagree about the completeness or accuracy 
of information about the options? Provide codes for each 
problem mentioned under PROBLEM. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes 
3 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF25 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 104D How well established was knowledge of the probable 
consequences of different options for solving the problem? 
Selecting different options involves considering future consequences. States must first 
develop a clear understanding of the future consequences of doing nothing about the 
problem. They must then develop a clear understanding on outputs, outcomes, and impacts of 
the other options at hand. These consequences can occur within as well as outside the issue 
area. 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
KNOW-CONSEQUENCES- 
OPTIONS How well established was knowledge of the probable 
consequences of different options for solving the problem? 
Provide codes for each problem mentioned under 
PROBLEM. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Strongly established understanding: States are aware of the possible outcomes, outputs, 
and impacts of doing nothing as well as of other available options. 
2 = Partially established understanding: Despite the achievement of a partial understanding 
of these consequences, there are still some major uncertainties with regard to possible 
consequences of doing nothing and consequences of other options. 
3 = Weakly established understanding: States do not have an understanding of the possible 
consequences of doing nothing or of the consequences of other possible options. 
4 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF26 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 104E Did the parties disagree about the probable 
consequences of selecting different options? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
CONSEQUENCES- 
OPTIONS-DISAGREE Did the parties disagree about the probable consequences of 
selecting different options? Provide codes for each problem 
mentioned under PROBLEM. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very strong disagreement between parties 
2 = Medium disagreement between parties 
3 = Low disagreement between parties 
4 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF27 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 104F What expert groups were present and active during the 
process of regime formation? 
The following four communities should be understood as social groups consisting of 
transnational networks of experts. Each group is held together through shared beliefs (e.g., 
about the causes and consequences of the problem, or about necessary policies, or normative 
and principled beliefs, or legal instruments for a regime). More than one of these groups may 
exist during regime formation, and there may also be overlaps between the four different kinds 
of expert groups. 
Provide codes for each element. 
EXPERT-GROUPS What expert groups were present and active during the 
process of regime formation? Check as many as apply. 
0 = Not applicable (no expert groups were present and active) 
1 = Science based communities (communities located in national and/or international research 
institutes and/or research departments) 
2 = Bureaucratic communities (communities located in government agencies, international 
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, etc. with a common policy enterprise) 
3 = Principled beliefs communities (with a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, 
which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members) 
4 = Legal beliefs communities (communities with shared beliefs about legal instruments 
towards management of the problem) 
5 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
105 STATES DURING REGIME FORMATION 
FORM: RF28 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 105A For each of the important states identified in the pre- 
coding agreement, indicate whether that state was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral. Include 
other states if especially noteworthy. 
This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element. 
STATE- 
PUSHER-LAGGARD For each state listed under IMPORTANT-NATIONS, 
indicate whether that state was a pusher, a laggard, or 
neutral. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Extreme pusher: A leading country that takes the initiative, proposes political measures 
at the international level to promote regime formation, and plays a very active role in the 
negotiations. A leader may first introduce domestic measures to lead the way for measures at 
the international level and may be subject to more domestic political pressure than other 
countries. Leaders are often the first to be severely affected by a special problem. 
2 = Pusher: A country sympathetic to regime formation that displays a more moderate 
attitude and political behavior in the political process compared with an extreme pusher (less 
political activity at the international level; proceeds more hesitantly in first introducing 
domestic measures to lead the way for measures at the international level). 
3 = Neutral: A country adopting a wait and see attitude. A neutral country may be severely 
affected by a special problem and may be confronted with domestic political pressure. The 
government prefers not to adopt a clear position with regard to supporting or opposing 
regime formation due to a lack of domestic political pressure, a lack of capacities. etc. 
4 = Laggard: A country that opposes regime formation but that displays a more moderate 
attitude and political behavior in the political process than an extreme laggard (less political 
activity at the international level). 
5 = Extreme laggard: A country that strongly opposes regime formation. An extreme laggard 
may act as a politically active counterpart to extreme pushers and pushers in the regime 
formation process. 
6 = Don't know 
IMPORTANT-NATION Important nationsfstates identified in the precoding 
agreement. Include other states if especially noteworthy. For 
each element, list up to ten additional states. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF29 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 105B For each of the important states identified in the pre- 
coding agreement and above, indicate whether that state's efforts were primarily structural, 
ideational, or entrepreneurial. 
This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element. 
IMPORTANT- 
NATION-EFFORT For each state listed under IMPORTANT-NATION, 
indicate whether that state's efforts were primarily structural, 
ideational, or entrepreneurial. For each state, check as many 
as apply. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Structural: States exercise their structural power or try to translate power into bargaining 
leverage capable of directing processes of regime formation. Such efforts can take the form 
of trying to promote or to prevent regime formation. The use of structural power can also 
include strategically deploying material resources to induce others to sign onto the central 
deals of an agreement. 
2 = Ideational: States focus on trying to put forward new systems of thought or worldviews, 
or to promote cognitive convergence encompassing not only new ideas about the causes of 
important problems but also prescriptions concerning appropriate solutions. Ideational efforts 
can take the form of trying to promote or prevent regime formation. 
3 = Entrepreneurial: International entrepreneurs are skilled at inventing new institutional 
arrangements and brokering the overlapping interests of parties concerned with a particular 
issue area. Entrepreneurs are self-interested in the sense that they seek gains for themselves 
in the form of material rewards or enhanced reputations, but this in no way detracts from the 
role they play. 
4 = No efforts: State did not display structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial efforts. 
5 = Don't know 
IMPORTANT-NATION Important nations/states identified in the precoding 
agreement and above. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF30 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 105C Were the efforts of individual pushers reinforcing or 
conflicting? Were the efforts of individual laggards reinforcing or conflicting? 
This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element. 
PUSHER-STATES- 
REINFORCING Were the efforts of individual pushers reinforcing or 
conflicting? 
0 = Not applicable (only one pushing country) 
1 = Reinforcing 
2 = Conflicting 
3 = Neither reinforcing nor conflicting 
4 = Don't know 
LAGGARD-STATES- 
REINFORCING Were the efforts of individual laggards reinforcing or 
conflicting? 
0 = Not applicable (only one laggard country) 
1 = Reinforcing 
2 = Conflicting 
3 = Neither reinforcing nor conflicting 
4 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
106 NON-STATE ACTORS DURING REGIME FORMA- 
TION 
FORM: RF31 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 106A What types of non-state actors were actively involved? 
If the European Union (formerly European Community) was involved, include it under 
"International governmental organizations (IGOs)". National and international activist 
interest groups include the entire range of involved activist interest groups, if they support 
regime formation or not. 
This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element. 
NONSTATE-GROUP What types of non-state actors were actively involved? Check 
as many as apply. 
0 = Not applicable (No non-state actors involved) 
1 = International governmental organizations (IGOs) 
2 = Sub-national governments 
3 = National activist interest groups (nonprofit organizations) 
4 = International activist interest groups (nonprofit organizations) 
5 = National industrial organizations (e.g., national trade unions, Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce, national federation of industries) 
6 = International industrial organizations (e.g., international federations of trade unions or 
industrial confederations) 
7= Multinational corporations (e.g., Shell, IBM, Microsoft) 
8 = National scientific organizations (e.g., national research centers) 
9 = International scientific organizations (e.g., International Council of Scientific Unions) 
10 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF32 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 106B For each of the important non-state actors identified in 
the precoding agreement, indicate whether that non-state actor was a pusher, a laggard, or 
neutral. Include other non-state actors if especially noteworthy. 
This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element. 
NONSTATE- 
PUSHER-LAGGARD For each non-state actor listed under NONSTATE, indicate 
whether that non-state actor was a pusher, a laggard, or 
neutral. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Extreme pusher: An actor that plays an active role in the political process; generates or 
promotes new ideas, knowledge, or policies; lobbies for political measures at the 
international level; and plays an advocacy role for regime formation. 
2 = Pusher: An actor that is sympathetic to regime formation but that displays a more 
moderate attitude and political behavior in the political process compared with an extreme 
pusher. 
3 = Neutral: An actor adopting a wait and see attitude. 
4 = Laggard: An actor that opposes regime formation but that displays a more moderate 
attitude and political behavior in the political process than an extreme laggard. 
5 = Extreme laggard: An actor that strongly opposes regime formation and lobbies against it. 
An extreme laggard may act as a politically active counterpart to extreme pushers and 
pushers in the regime formation process and may generate new ideas and promote concepts 
and knowledge to oppose regime formation. 
6 = Don't know 
NONSTATE Non-state actors identified in the precoding agreement. 
Include other non-state actors if especially noteworthy. For 
each element, list up to ten additional non-state actors. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF33 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 106C For each of the non-state actors identified in the pre- 
coding agreement and above, indicate whether its efforts were primarily structural, 
ideational, or entrepreneurial. 
This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element. 
NONSTATE-EFFORT For each non-state actor listed under NONSTATE, indicate 
whether that non-state actor's efforts were primarily 
structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial. For each non-state 
actor, check as many as apply. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Structural: Non-state actors assume the roles as agents of states and try to translate the 
power of a single state into political leverage to influence regime formation. There is a 
smooth transition from conscious structural guidance as a result of control by the relevant 
state and a more unconscious structural guidance, where the non-state actor has room to 
move and make its decisions independent of the state actor. Structural efforts can take the 
form of trying to promote or prevent regime formation. 
2 = Ideational: Non-state actors focus on putting forward new systems of thought or 
worldviews or promoting cognitive convergence encompassing not only new ideas about the 
causes of important problems but also prescriptions concerning appropriate solutions. 
Ideational efforts can take form of trying to promote or prevent regime formation. 
3 = Entrepreneurial: Non-state actors tend to take the ideas of ideational leaders and translate 
them into concrete policy options, proposals, etc. This includes the use of skills to frame 
issues and put together deals that would otherwise elude participants endeavoring to form 
international regimes as well as working as brokers to make deals and line up support for 
salient options. International entrepreneurs are skilled at inventing new institutional 
arrangements and brokering the overlapping interests of parties concerned with a particular 
issue area. 
4 = No efforts: Non-state actor does not display structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial 
efforts. 
5 = Don't know 
NONSTATE Important non-state actors identified in the precoding agree- 
ment and above. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF34 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 106D Were the efforts of individual non-state pushers 
reinforcing or conflicting? Were the efforts of individual non-state laggards reinforcing or 
conflicting? 
This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element. 
PUSHER-NONSTATK 
REINFORCING Were the efforts of individual non-state pushers reinforcing or 
conflicting? 
O= Not applicable (only one pushing non-state actor) 
1 = Reinforcing 
2 = Conflicting 
3 = Neither reinforcing nor conflicting 
4 = Don't know 
LAGGARD-STATES- 
REINFORCING Were the efforts of individual non-state laggards reinforcing 
or conflicting? 
O= Not applicable (only one laggard non-state actor) 
1 = Reinforcing 
2 = Conflicting 
3 = Neither reinforcing nor conflicting 
4 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
107 INDIVIDUALS DURING REGIME FORMATION 
FORM: RF35 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 107A For each of the important individuals identified in the 
precoding agreement, indicate whether that individual was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral. 
Include other individuals if especially noteworthy. 
This question aims at individuals who may occupy roles in organizations or states. While 
these individuals may act as agents of their nationallinternational organizations or states, 
individuals can also act outside their role as agents of organizations and states due to their 
moral, professional, political reputation. 
This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element. 
INDIVIDUAL- 
PUSHER-LAGGARD Indicate for each individual listed under INDIVIDUAL 
whether shethe was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Extreme pusher: An individual who takes the initiative, plays an active role in the 
political process and in the negotiations (e.g., proposes political measures at the international 
level, makes compromise proposals, serves as a mediator between opposing actors, or 
strongly favors single political measures, etc.) to promote regime formation. 
2 = Pusher: An individual who is sympathetic to regime formation but who displays a more 
moderate attitude and political behavior in the political process compared with an extreme 
pusher. 
3 = Neutral: An actor adopting a wait and see attitude. 
4 = Laggard: An individual who opposes regime formation but who displays a more 
moderate attitude and political behavior in the political process than an extreme laggard. 
5 = Extreme laggard: An individual who strongly opposes regime formation. An extreme 
laggard may act as a politically active counterpart to extreme pushers and pushers in the 
regime formation process. 
6 = Don't know 
INDIVIDUAL Important individual identified in the precoding agreement. 
Include other individuals if especially noteworthy. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF36 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 107B For each of the individuals identified in the precoding 
agreement and above, indicate whether herlhis efforts where primarily structural, ideational, 
or entrepreneurial. 
This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element. 
INDIVIDUAL-EFFORT For each individual listed under INDIVIDUAL, indicate 
whether that individual's efforts where primarily structural, 
ideational, or entrepreneurial. For each individual, check as 
many as apply. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Structural: Individuals act as agents of states and try to translate the power of a single 
state into political leverage to influence regime formation. There is a smooth transition from 
conscious structural guidance as a result of control by the relevant state and a more 
unconscious structural guidance, where the individual has more room to move and make 
decisions independent of the state. Structural roles can be played by official negotiators. 
Structural efforts can take form of trying to promote or prevent regime formation. 
2 = Ideational: Individuals focus on putting forward new systems of thought or worldviews 
or promoting cognitive convergence encompassing not only new ideas about the causes of 
important problems but also prescriptions concerning appropriate solutions. Ideational efforts 
can take form of trying to promote or to prevent regime formation. 
3 = Entrepreneurial: Entrepreneurial influence tends to take the ideas of ideational leaders 
and translate these ideas into concrete policy options, proposals, etc. This includes the use of 
skills to frame issues in ways that foster integrative bargaining and put together deals that 
would otherwise elude participants endeavoring to form international regimes as well as 
working as brokers to make deals and line up support for salient options. Entrepreneurs work 
as agenda setters and popularizers to shape the issues and to draw attention to the relevance 
of the problem. 
4 = No efforts: Individual does not display structural, ideational, or entrepreneurial efforts. 
5 = Don't know 
INDIVIDUAL Important individuals identified in the precoding agreement 
and above. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF37 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 107C Were the efforts of individuals who were important 
pushers reinforcing or conflicting? Where the efforts of individuals who were important 
laggards reinforcing or conflicting? 
This question refers to the whole regime formation process. Provide codes for each element. 
PUSHER-IND- 
REINFORCING Were the efforts of individuals who were important pushers 
reinforcing or conflicting? 
O= Not applicable (only one pusher) 
1 = Reinforcing 
2 = Conflicting 
3 = Neither reinforcing nor conflicting 
4 = Don't know 
LAGGARD-IND- 
REINFORCING Where the efforts of individuals who were important laggards 
reinforcing or conflicting? 
O= Not applicable (only one laggard) 
1 = Reinforcing 
2 = Conflicting 
3 = Neither reinforcing nor conflicting 
4 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
108 AGENDA FORMATION 
FORM: RF38 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 108A When did the problem to be addressed by the regime 
initially make its way onto the international political agenda? Did the problem stay on the 
agenda continuously until the negotiations started? When was the last time the problem 
appeared on the agenda before the negotiations started? 
Provide date only for such elements, where applicable. If the problem reappeared one or more 
times, mention when the problem first appeared on the agenda. 
A problem is on the international political agenda if a bilateral or multilateral body (e.g., 
bilateral governmental meeting, multilateral governmental meeting of the G 7, meetings of 
bodies of international organizations, etc.) formally deals with it. 
AGENDA-ENTER When did the problem to be addressed by the regime initially 
make its way onto the international political agenda? State the 
time as precisely as possible (year as a four digit number, e.g., 
1996). Provide date only for such elements, where applicable. 
Did the problem stay on the agenda continuously until the 
negotiations started? Provide codes only for such elements, 
where applicable. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes 
3 = Don't know 
AGENDA-REAPPEAR If AGENDA-CONTINUOUSLY is coded '1' (=no): When 
was the last time the problem appeared on the agenda before 
the negotiations started? State the time as precisely as possible 
(year as a four digit number, e.g., 1996). Provide date only for 
such elements, where applicable. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF39 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: lO8B Which of the following factors were present during 
agenda formation? Which of these factors were most influential for agenda formation? 
If the European Union (formerly European Community) was involved, include it under 
"International governmental organizations (IGOs)". 
Provide codes for each element. 
AGENDA-FACTORS Which of the following factors were present during agenda 
formation? Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention 
additional factors. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Leadership of state pushers (no hegemon) 
2 = Power of hegemon in the issue area 
3 = Leadership of IGOs 
4 = Activities of activist nonprofit interest groups 
5 = Activities of industrial organizations 
6 = Activities of multinational corporations 
7 = International ad hoc conference or workshop 
8 = Activities of scientific organizations 
8 = Consensual knowledge from epistemic community 
9 = New scientific knowledge 
10 = External shocks/crisis (e.g. sudden event) 
11 = Growing public consciousness about the problem 
12 = Worsening of a problem 
13 = Don't know 
14 = If applicable, mention additional factors 
AGENDA- 
FACTORS-PRESENT Which of the factors checked or mentioned under AGENDA- 
FACTORS were most influential for agenda formation? 
1 = Factor present 
2 = Factor present and most influential 
3 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF40 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 108C Provide a textual explanation of what caused the shift 
from agenda formation to explicit negotiations. 
Provide information for each element. Refer explicitly to items mentioned in the previous form. 
FACTORS-SHIFT Provide a textual explanation of what caused the shift from 
agenda formation to explicit negotiations. Refer explicitly to 
items mentioned in the previous form. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF41 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 108D Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by 
a single state or a small group of potential regime members? Was the inclusion of issues on 
the agenda determined by potential regime members negotiating among themselves more or 
less as equals and setting the terms of the agenda deliberately? Was the inclusion of issues on 
the agenda determined by factors largely outside deliberate efforts of potential regime 
members? 
Provide codes for each element. 
AGENDA- 
STATE-DETERMINED Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by a 
single state or a small group of potential regime members? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very strongly dominated by a single state or a small group of potential regime members: 
A single state or a small group of potential regime members dominated agenda formation. 
The main issues on the agenda were imposed on other actors. One or more dominant powers 
succeeded in setting the agenda in the issue area. 
2 = Strongly dominated by a single state or a small group of potential regime members: 
Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3 = Relevance of domination by a single state or a small group of potential regime members: 
One or more states tried to dominate agenda formation and to impose the main issues on the 
agenda on other actors, but the dominating states were only partially successful in forcing the 
others to agree to the main issues on the agenda. 
4 = Minor relevance of domination by a single state or small group of potential regime 
members: Between 3 and 5 on the scale. 
5 = Domination by a single state or a small group of potential regime members not at all 
relevant: Domination by a single state or a small group of potential regime members did not 
play a role during negotiations. 
6 = Don't know 
AGENDA-INTERSTATE- 
DETERMINED Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by 
potential regime members negotiating among themselves 
more or less as equals and setting the terms of the agenda 
deliberately? 
0 = Not applicable 
1= Very strongly an interstate process of potential regime members negotiating among 
themselves more or less as equals: Agenda formation consisted mainly of a joint and 
deliberate process of more or less equal actors. The main issues appearing on the agenda 
were the result of a bargaining process among more or less equal states. 
2 = Strongly an interstate process of potential regime members negotiating among 
themselves more or less as equals: Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3= Relevance of an interstate process of potential regime members negotiating among 
themselves more or less as equals: Agenda formation was only partially a process involving 
more or less equal states making joint and deliberate efforts regarding agenda formation. 
Only a few of the issues on the agenda were agreed upon through a bargaining process 
among more or less equal states and deliberately. 
4 = Minor relevance of an interstate process of potential regime members negotiating among 
themselves more or less as equals: Between 3 and 5 on the scale. 
5 = Interstate process of potential regime members negotiating among themselves more or 
less as equals not at all relevant: Interstate process of potential regime members negotiating 
among themselves as equals did not play a role during agenda formation. 
6 = Don't know 
AGENDA-OUTSIDE- 
DETERMINED Was the inclusion of issues on the agenda determined by 
factors largely outside deliberate efforts of potential regime 
members? 
0 = Not applicable 
1= Very strongly determined by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime 
members: Agenda formation was determined by factors largely outside deliberate efforts of 
potential regime members (e.g., external shocks, actions of nongovernmental actors, 
intergovernmental organizations, individual experts or actions of states considered as not 
being potential members of the regime). 
2= Strongly determined by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members: 
Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3= Relevance of determination by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime 
members: Agenda formation was only partially determined by factors largely outside 
deliberate efforts of potential regime members (e.g., external shocks, actions of nongovern- 
mental actors, intergovernmental organizations, individual experts or actions of states 
considered as not being potential members of the regime). 
4 = Minor relevance of determination by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime 
members: Between 3 and 5 on the scale. 
5 = Determination by factors outside deliberate efforts of potential regime members not at all 
relevant: Agenda formation by factors largely outside deliberate efforts of potential regime 
members did not play any role. 
6 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
109 NEGOTIATION STAGE 
FORM: RF42 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109A Were there earlier negotiations that failed to create a 
regime in the issue area? If yes, when did the latest effort that failed start and end? 
An earlier attempt to negotiate failed if it ended without an agreement about the issue or 
without an agreement about further negotiations. 
Provide codes for each element. 
NEGOTIATLEARLIER Were there earlier negotiations that failed to create a regime in 
the issue area? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = There was no earlier attempt that failed 
2 = There was one earlier attempt that failed 
3 = There were more than one earlier attempts that failed 
4 = Don't know 
NEGOTIATE- 
EARLIER-START If NEGOTIATEEARLIER is coded '2' (=there was one 
earlier attempt that failed) or '3' (=there were more than one 
earlier attempts that failed): When did the latest effort that 
failed start? State the time as precisely as possible (year as a 
four digit number, e.g., 1996). 
NEGOTIATE- 
EARLIER-END If NEGOTIATEEARLIER is coded '2' (=there was one 
earlier attempt that failed) or '3' (=there were more than one 
earlier attempts that failed): When did the latest effort that 
failed end? State the time as precisely as possible (year as a 
four digit number, e.g., 1996). 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF43 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109B When did the explicit negotiations that led to the regime 
start? When did they end? 
Provide codes for each element. 
NEGOTIATE-START When did the explicit negotiations that led to the regime start? 
Enter month as a full name. Enter year as a four digit 
number. Example: December 1950. 
NEGOTIATE-END When did the explicit negotiations that led to the regime 
end? Enter month as a full name. Enter year as a four digit 
number. Example: December 1950. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF44 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109C Under whose auspices did the negotiations take place? 
Provide codes for each element. 
NEGOTIATE-AUSPICES Under whose auspices did the negotiations take place? Check 
as many as apply. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = None 
2 = Global IGOs (e.g., UN system) 
3 = Regional IGOs 
4 = Nation state(s) 
5 = Non-state actor(s) 
6 = Don't know 
NEGOTIATE- 
AUSPICES-ACTOR If NEGOTIATE-AUSPICES is coded '2' (=global IGOs), 
'3' (=regional IGOs), '4' [=nation state(s)] or '5' [=non-state 
actor(s)], mention these organization(s), nation state(s), or 
non-state actor(s). 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF45 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109D How many actors participated in the negotiations as 
official participants and observers? 
Indicate number of actors (states, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental 
organizations) at the beginninglend of the negotiations. Actors can be states or non-state actors. 
Provide information only for non-state actors that aspired to become formal members of the 
regime. 
Provide codes for each element. 
NEGOTIATEi-ACTORS What type of actors participated in the negotiations. Check 
as many as apply. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = States as participants 
2 = States as observers 
3 = Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) as participants 
4 = Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) as observers 
5 = Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) as participants 
6 = Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) as observers 
7 = Don't know 
NEGOTIATE 
ACTORS-START How many actors participated at the beginning of the 
negotiations as official participants and observers? Provide 
codes for each type of actors checked under 
NEGOTIATE-ACTORS. 
NEGOTIATE 
ACTORS-END How many actors participated at the end of the negotiations 
as official participants and observers? Provide codes for each 
type of actors checked under NEGOTIATE-ACTORS. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF46 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109E Were there states not participating in the negotiation 
process that other actors believed should have participated? 
Provide codes for each element. 
NEGOTIATE- 
NOT-PARTICIPATE Were there states not participating in the negotiation process 
that other actors believed should have participated? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes 
3 = Don't know 
NEGOTIATE- 
NOT-STATE If NEGOTIATE-NOT-PARTICIPATE is coded '2' (=yes): 
Mention states that were either important contributors to the 
problem or that were important in terms of problem solving. 
For each element, list up to ten countries. 
NEGOTIATE 
NOT-STATETYPE For each state listed under NEGOTIATE-NOT-STATE, 
indicate whether the state was an important contributor to the 
problem or important in terms of problem solving. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Important contributor to the problem 
2 = Important in terms of problem solving 
3 = Important contributor to the problem and important in terms of problem solving 
4 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF47 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109F Indicate the negotiation strategies employed by each of the 
important states and coalitions identified in the precoding agreement. Write a paragraph 
describing the essential nature of the strategies used during the negotiation phase emplq-ing the 
keywords checked below. 
Provide codes for each element. 
NEGOTIATE- 
STRATEGIES Indicate the negotiation strategies employed by each of the 
important states and coalitions identified in the precoding 
agreement. For each actorhloc mentioned under 
IMPORTANT-NATION and COALITION indicate, which 
kind of strategy was employed by that actorhloc. For each 
actorhloc mentioned under IMPORTANLNATION and 
COALITION, check as many as apply. If applicable, add other 
strategies. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Exit option (e.g., withdrawal from negotiations in case of inclusion of certain items in the 
possible agreement) 
2 = Threats (e.g., threat to induce domestic legislation against rising automobile exports from 
another country in case it does not accede to restrict its exports) 
3 = Coercion (e.g., already enacted domestic legislation against rising automobile exports from 
another country to enforce its agreement to internationally agreed upon rules) 
4 = Logrolling (negotiations involving two or more distinct issues: when one party agrees to 
support another party's preferred outcome on one issue and the other party reciprocates on 
another issue) 
5 = Persuasion (e.g., inducing laggards to give up opposing views with regard to certain 
subjects in the negotiations) 
6 = Issue Linkage (settling conflicts between at least two different blocslactors having opposing 
interests with regard to two independent issues; e.g., achieving consensus on arms reduction in 
combination with settling another economic issue between the actors) 
7 = Promises (e.g., promising others to give up a certain behavior in or outside the issue area if 
they agree to certain regime provisions) 
8 = Sidepayments (e.g., rewarding others to reach their agreement to the regime provisions by 
providing them with financial, technological or other ways of support) 
9 = Self-commitment (e.g., a state committing itsself to arms reductions before having reached 
agreement with other states) 
10 = Shaming (blaming other states for their practises in the issue area) 
1 I = Coalition-building (e.g., looking for other partners for the purpose of strengthening the 
bargaining position) 
12 = Search for joint gains (e.g., identifying policies which offer rewards for most of the 
participants) 
13 = Decomposition (separating an issue into its constituent parts or components) 
14 = Bring in third parties (entrusting a third party with the function of a mediatorldeveloper of 
compromise) 
15 = Reducing complexity (e.g., reducing the number of single issues to be regulated, reducing 
the number of states involved, reducing the implications of regulations in a single issue area 
for other issue areas) 
16 = Increasing complexity (e.g., increasing the number of single issues to be regulated, 
increasing the number of states involved, increasing the implications of regulations in a 
single issue area for other issue areas) 
17 = Delaying tactics to get new adherents for regime formation (e.g., waiting until other states 
decide to join the position of a key participant or bloc) 
18 = Delaying tactics to delaylprevent regime formation (e.g., key participant or bloc insisting 
on extreme demands or leading long discussions about the rules of procedure to delay or 
prevent regime formation) 
19 = Take over secretarial responsibilities (e.g., key participant or bloc gaining control over 
services provided [framing of texts from the secretariat, etc.]) 
20 = Alter institutional stetting (e.g., among a variety of institutional forums for regime 
formation, key participants or blocs identifying the forum displaying the best or worst 
conditions for regime formation, key participants or blocs changing forum for regime formation 
after experiences in former forum which were in contrast to their expectations) 
21 = Don't know 
22 = If applicable, add other strategies 
IMPORTANT-NATION Important nationslstates identified in the precoding agreement. 
COALITION Important coalitions identified in the precoding agreement. 
NEGOTIATE 
STRATEGIES-NATURE Write a paragraph describing the essential nature of the 
strategies used during the negotiation phase employing the 
keywords checked under NEGOTIATE-STRATEGIES. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF48 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109G Did potential signatories participate in the negotiations but 
fail to sign the agreement reached? 
Provide codes for each element. 
NEGOTIATE- 
NO-SIGNATURE Did potential signatories participate in the negotiations but fail 
to sign the agreement reached? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 =No 
2 = Yes 
3 = Don't know 
NEGOTIATE-NO- 
SIGNATURE-STATE If NEGOTIATENO-SIGNATURE is coded '2' (=yes), 
please list up to five such nonsignatories. If there are more 
than five to choose from, select five important participants. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF49 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109H What roles did non-state actors play in the negotiations? 
Provide codes for each element. 
NEGOTIATE 
NON-STATEROLE What roles did non-state actors play in the negotiations? For 
each non-state actor listed under NONSTATE indicate what 
role that actor played in the negotiations. For each non-state 
actor, check as many as apply. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Observer role 
2 = Member of national delegation 
3 = Member of negotiation body 
4 = Exerted pressure inside the negotiations 
5 = Exerted pressure outside the negotiations 
6 = Don't know 
NONSTATE Important non-state actors identified in the precoding 
agreement. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF50 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 1091 In a short paragraph, evaluate how influential these non- 
state actors were during the negotiations. 
Provide information for each element. 
NEGOTIATE-NON- 
STATLNARRATIVE In a short paragraph, evaluate how influential these non-state 
actors were during the negotiations. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF51 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 109J Were the negotiations dominated by a single state or a 
small group of states, by an interstate process among relative equals, or by transnational forces? 
Provide codes for each element. 
STATE-DOMINATION Were the negotiations dominated by a single state or a small 
group of states? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very strongly dominated by a single state or a small group of states: A single state or a 
small group of states dominated the negotiations. Negotiations consisted of a process in 
which a single state or a small group of states imposed the main regime provisions on other 
actors. One or more dominant states succeeded in getting others to accept the requirements of 
the arrangement. 
2 = Strongly dominated by a single state or a small group of states: Between 1 and 3 on the 
scale. 
3 = Relevance of domination by a single state or a small group of states: One or more states 
tried to dominate negotiations and to impose the main regime provisions on other actors, but 
the dominating states were only partially successful in forcing the others to agree to the main 
regime provisions. 
4 = Minor relevance of domination by a single state or a small group of states: Between 3 
and 5 on the scale. 
5 =   om in at ion by a single state or a small group of states not at all relevant: Domination by 
a single or small group of states did not play a role during negotiations. 
6 = Don't know 
INTERSTATE- 
DOMINATION Were the negotiations dominated by an interstate process 
among relative equals? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very strongly a bargaining process among relative equal states: Negotiations mainly 
consisted of a bargaining process among relative equal states. The main regime provisions 
were a product of bargaining in which differing interests were reconciled. 
2 = Strongly a bargaining process among relative equal states: Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3 = Relevance of a bargaining process among relative equal states: Negotiations featured 
only a partial bargaining process among relative equal states. Only parts of the regime 
provisions were agreed upon through a bargaining process among more or less equal states. 
4 = Minor relevance of bargaining process among relative equal states: Between 3 and 5 on 
the scale. 
5 = Bargaining process among more relative equal states not at all relevant: Bargaining 
among relative equal states did not play a role during negotiations. 
6 = Don't know 
TRANSNATIONAL- 
DOMINATION Were the negotiations dominated by transnational forces? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very strongly dominated by transnational actors: Negotiations were very strongly 
dominated by transnational actors which were the most important actors during negotiations. 
The main regime provisions were products of the activities of transnational actors (e.g., 
international nongovernmental organizations like multinational corporations, transnational 
issue-networks, experts, etc.). States played only a minor role and were heavily influenced by 
and/or relied on transnational actors as advisors, pressure groups, etc. 
2 = Strongly dominated by transnational actors: Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3 = Relevance of domination by transnational actors: Transnational actors tried to dominate 
negotiations and to determine the main regime provisions, but succeeded only partially, as 
other actors (especially states) influenced the negotiations and the main regime provisions. 
4 = Minor relevance of domination by transnational actors: Between 3 and 5 on the scale. 
5 = Domination by transnational by transnational actors not at all relevant: Transnational 
actors did not play any important role during negotiations. 
6 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
110 OPERATIONALIZATION STAGE 
FORM: RF52 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 1 lOA What steps were required for the relevant agreements to 
become operational? Indicate these steps for each agreement identified in the precoding 
agreement. 
Provide codes for each element. 
OPERATIONAL-STEPS What steps were required for the relevant agreements to 
become operational? Indicate these steps for each agreement 
listed under AGREEMENTS. For each agreement, check as 
many as apply. If applicable, mention additional steps required 
for an agreement to become operational. 
O= Not applicable (e.g., no steps required) 
1 = Ratification by members 
2 = Implementing legislation passed by members 
3 = Issuance of order or decree from government executive 
4 = Formation of regime bodies (committees, secretariats, etc.) 
5 = Entry into force of other international legal instruments 
6 = Don't know 
7 = If applicable, mention additional steps required for an agreement to become operational 
OPERATIONAL- 
RATIFY-NUMBER If OPERATIONAL-STEPS is coded '1' (=ratification by 
members), indicate how many ratifications were required for 
the agreement (number). 
AGREEMENTS Agreements identified in the precoding agreement that are part 
of the regime by name. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF53 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: llOB How long did it take for the relevant agreements of the 
regime to become operational? Provide information for each relevant agreement identified in 
the precoding agreement. 
Provide codes for each element. 
OPERATIONAL- 
SIGNATURE For each agreement listed under AGREEMENTS, indicate 
when the agreement was signed. Enter month as a full name. 
Enter year as a four digit number. Example: December 1950. 
OPERATIONAL- 
ENTRY-INTO-FORCE For each agreement listed under AGREEMENTS, indicate 
when the agreement entered into force. Enter month as a full 
name. Enter year as a four digit number. Example: 
December 1950. 
AGREEMENTS Agreements identified in the precoding agreement that are part 
of the regime by name. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF54 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 1 10C Were there serious disagreements among potential regime 
members concerning whether to make the agreement(s) operational? If so, were these 
disagreements resolved through actions of a single state or a small group of states, by an 
interstate process among relative equals, or by transnational forces? 
Provide codes for each element. 
DISPUTE- 
OPERATIONAL Were there serious disagreements among potential regime 
members concerning whether to make the agreement(s) 
operational? Provide codes for each agreement listed under 
AGREEMENTS. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes 
3 = Don't know 
DISPUTE- 
STATE-RESOLVED If DISPUTE-OPERATIONAL is coded '2' (=yes) for an 
agreement listed under AGREEMENTS, indicate whether 
these disagreements were resolved through actions of a single 
state or a small group of states. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very strongly dominated by a single state or small group of states: The dispute was 
resolved through actions taken by a single state or a small group of states, which imposed 
operationalization on other actors. One or more dominant powers succeeded in getting others 
to operationalize the regime. 
2 = Strongly dominated by a single state or small group of states: Between 1 and 3 on the 
scale. 
3 = Relevance of domination by a single state or small group of states: One or more states 
tried to impose operationalization on other actors, but the dominating states were only 
partially successful in forcing the others to operationalize the agreement. 
4= Minor relevance of domination by a single state or small group of states: Between 3 and 5 
on the scale. 
5 = Domination by a single state or small group of states not at all relevant: Domination by a 
single state or small group of states did not play a role in resolving a dispute about 
operationalization. 
6 = Don't know 
DISPUTE- 
INTERSTATE-RESOLVED If DISPUTE_OPERATIONAL is coded '2' (=yes) for an 
agreement listed under AGREEMENTS, indicate whether 
these disagreements were resolved by an interstate process 
among relative equals. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very strongly a bargaining process among relative equal states: Resolution of disputes 
regarding operationalization consisted mainly of a bargaining process among relative equal 
states. Resolution of disputes regarding operationalization were a product of bargaining, in 
which differing interests were reconciled. 
2 = Strongly a bargaining process among relative equal states: Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3 = Relevance of a bargaining process among relative equal states: Resolution of disputes 
regarding operationalization of an agreement was only partially a bargaining process among 
relative equal states. Operationalization was only partially achieved through a bargaining 
process among relative equal states. 
4 = Minor relevance of bargaining process among more or less equal states: Between 3 and 5 
on the scale. 
5 = Bargaining process among relative equal states not at all relevant: Bargaining among 
relative equal states did not play a role in resolving disputes about operationalization of an 
agreement. 
6 = Don't know 
DISPUTE 
FORCES-RESOLVED If DISPUTE-OPERATIONAL is coded '2' (=yes) for an 
agreement listed under AGREEMENTS, indicate whether 
these disagreements were resolved by transnational forces. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very strongly dominated by transnational actors: Resolution of disputes regarding 
operationalization was very strongly dominated by transnational actors which were the most 
important actors forcing others to operationalize the agreement. Resolution of disputes 
regarding operationalization was a product of the activities of transnational actors (e.g., 
international nongovernmental organizations like multinational corporations, transnational 
issue-networks, experts, etc.). States only played a minor role and were heavily influenced by 
and/or relied on transnational actors as advisors, pressure groups, etc. 
2 = Strongly dominated by transnational actors: Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3 = Relevance of domination by transnational actors: Transnational actors tried to dominate 
resolution of disputes regarding operationalization, but succeeded only partially, as other 
actors (especially states) influenced resolution of disputes regarding operationalization. 
4 = Minor relevance of domination by transnational actors: Between 3 and 5 on the scale. 
5 = Domination by transnational by transnational actors not at all relevant: Transnational 
actors did not play any important role in solving disputes about operationalization. 
6 = Don't know 
AGREEMENTS Agreements identified in the precoding agreement that are 
part of the regime by name. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF55 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 1 lOD Did the parties agree to act as if the agreement were 
already in force before the regime became operational? 
Provide codes for each element. 
OPERATIONAL-ALREADY Did the parties agree to act as if the agreement were already in 
force before the regime became operational? Provide codes 
for each agreement listed under AGREEMENTS. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes, and they explicitly provided for it in the regime 
3 = Yes, but they did not explicitly provide for it in the regime 
4 = Don't know 
OPERATIONAL- 
ALREADY-WHEN If OPERATIONALBEFORE is coded '2' (=yes, and they 
explicitly provided for it in the regime) or '3' (=yes, but they 
did not explicitly provide for it in the regime), mention when 
the agreement became informally operational. Enter month as 
a full name. Enter year as a four digit number. Example: 
December 1950. 
AGREEMENTS Agreements identified in the precoding agreement that are 
part of the regime by name. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RF56 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 1 lOE How severe were the domestic political battles over the 
terms of the agreement within member states during the operationalization stage? 
Provide codes for each element. 
DOMESTIC- 
B ATTLES-SEVERE For each agreement listed under AGREEMENTS, indicate 
severity of domestic battles within members states over the 
terms of the agreement during the operationalization stage. 
1 = Very strong political battles: Political battles over the terms of the agreement were so 
severe that it was no longer certain whether a country would remain a member of the regime 
(e.g., domestic political battles led the U.S. not to join the League of Nations. In the U.S. 
threatened industries, unions and environmentalists fought hard against ratification of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, which was ratified in the end). 
2 = Strong political battles: Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3 = Medium political battles: Political battles over the terms of the agreement occurred, but 
membership was not really called into question. Some political forces accepted the 
agreement but asked for slight changes or accompanied the "Yes" with a warning that some 
objections should be considered with the next agreement of this type (e.g., Maastricht 
ratification debate in Germany, where Bavaria raised objections, leading to a supreme court 
ruling that warned about additional restrictions to sovereignty). 
4 = Few political battles: Between 3 and 5 on the scale. 
5 = Political battles not at all relevant: No political battles over the terms of the agreements 
occurred (e.g., smooth ratification of the U.N. Charter in the U.S.). 
6 = Don't know 
DOMESTIC-B ATTLES For each agreement listed under AGREEMENTS, indicate 
how many countries experienced the extent of domestic 
battles checked under DONIESTIC-BATTLES-SEVERE. 
For each agreement, code no more than four answers. 
1 = Some countries, less than 20 percent 
2 = Many countries, between 20 and 50 percent 
3 = Most countries, between 50 and 99 percent 
4 = All countries, 100 percent 
5 = Don't know 
AGREEMENTS Agreements identified in the precoding agreement that are 
part of the regime by name. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
11 1 NARRATIVE 
FORM: RF57 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 11 1A Write a short description of the central aspects of regime 
formation. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also 
appropriate to include information not coded above. List the most important literature used in 
coding the regime formation part of the data protocol. 
Provide information for each element. 
REGIME-FORMATION- 
NARRATIVE Write a short description of the central aspects of regime 
formation. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above 
if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include 
information not coded above. 
FORMATION- 
LITERATURE List the most important literature used in coding the regime 
formation part of the data protocol (If possible, indicate 
author(s), editor(s). book title, article, and year). 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
PART I1 
Regime Attributes 
PART I1 - TABLE OF CONTENTS 
201 STATED AND UNSTATED GOALS 
201A Does the regime have stated goals? If so, what are the most important stated goals of the regime? 
Identify up to five. 
201B Does the regime have unstated goals? If so, what are the most important unstated goals of the 
regime? Identify up to five. 
202 LARGER VISION OR THEORY 
202A Does the regime reflect some larger vision or theory regarding the organization and operation of 
international society? 
203 OVERALL CHARACTERISTICS 
203A Is the regime an explicit or a tacit regime? 
203B To what extent is the regime an internal or an external regime? 
203C Do the principles and norms of the regime apply only to members as such, or are members 
responsible for ensuring that these provisions are complied with by other actors operating within their 
jurisdiction? 
203D Can the regime's principles be characterized in terms of the three fundamental types of property 
rights/allocation rules? 
204 PRINCIPLES AND NORMS 
204A Identify the most important regime-specific principles and norms. Mention whether the constitutive 
agreements make explicit reference to each principle or norm, or whether the commitment is implicit. 
205 REGIME RULES 
205A What are the substantive rules or prescriptions of the regime? Indicate whether the constitutive 
agreements make explicit reference to the rules. 
205B Is it possible to categorize the regime's substantive rules as requirements, prohibitions, or 
permissions? 
205C Are the regime's substantive rules legally binding on the members, or do they have the character of 
soft law (e.g., ministerial declarations, codes of conduct)? 
205D Are the regime's substantive rules generally precise and easy to interpret in the sense that they call 
for well-defined actions, or are they ambiguous and indeterminate? 
205E Does the regime have substantive rules that differentiate among its members in terms of 
requirements, prohibitions, or permissions? 
205F Is the regime narrow or broad as measured by the functional scope of its rules? 
205G Is the regime shallow or deep as measured by the density and specificity of its rules? 
206 PROGRAMS 
206A Does the regime explicitly call for the conduct of programmatic activities? 
206B If the regime explicitly calls for the conduct of programmatic activities, to what extent are those who 
participate in relevant advisory bodies/prograrnrnatic activities recognized as experts in the field? 
206C If the regime explicitly calls for the conduct of programmatic activities, who controls participation 
and the agenda in the bodies carrying out programmatic activities? 
206D Does the regime have de facto programs that differ materially from explicitly mandated programs? 
207 MEMBERSHIP 
207A How many formal members do the relevant agreements have? 
207B Are there informal members (states or non-state actors that have not formally signed the regime's 
constitutive agreements or otherwise acquired membership) but that have rights and obligations under the 
terms of the regime and have a voice in its decisionmaking processes? If yes, identify these members. 
207C Are there state or non-state actors that are important in terms of the problem to be solved but that are 
not members of the regime? 
207D Are there explicit provisions that target activities (e.g., oil tanker operators in MARPOL) of non- 
state actors or that cover the participation of non-state actors (e.g., provisions governing observer status for 
non-state actors in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna) 
in the regime? If so, elaborate on the nature of the rules in a paragraph. 
208 MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA AND RULES 
208A What criteria govern eligibility for membership? 
208B How many states meet these criteria? 
208C Do the rules pertaining to the admission of non-founding members differ from the admission rules 
applied to founding or original members? If yes, please describe. 
208D Is there a single category of membership or are there provisions establishing more than one category 
of membership? 
208E Do the regime's provisions allow for role differentiation among the members? 
209 SECRETARIAT 
209A Did the members of the regime establish a secretariat for the regime as a whole or any of its 
elements? 
209B How independent is the secretariat from the regime's members? 
2 10 DECISIONMAKING 
210A What types of formal decisions are made by the regime? 
210B What decision rules does the regime provide for and use in arriving at decisions? 
210C What decisionmaking bodies are provided for in the regime? 
210D How do these bodies participate in decisionmaking? Is participation by these bodies carried out 
in accordance with the constitutive provisions of the regime? 
210E Are there other bodies within the regime that play a role in decisionmaking but are not explicitly 
provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions? How do these bodies participate in decision- 
making? 
210F Does the regime formally or informally delegate decisionmaking power to any external bodies? 
210G How do the external bodies to which the regime informally or formally delegated decisionmaking 
power participate in decisionmaking? 
210H Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the issues that get on the decisionmaking 
agenda of bodies explicitly provided for by the regime? 
2101 Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the issues that get on the decisionmaking 
agenda of bodies not explicitly provided for by the regime? 
2105 Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the issues that get on the decisionmaking 
agenda of external bodies to which the regime formally or informally delegates decisionmaking power? 
210K In a short paragraph describe the essential features of the regime's decisionmaking bodies as well 
as their interactions with each other. 
21 1 FUNDING MECHANISMS 
211A How are the regime's activities and administrative operations (including the work of the 
secretariat) funded? 
21 1B How are the programmatic activities of the regime funded? 
21 1C What kinds of financial mechanisms have been created under the regime? Does the regime make 
use of annual or multiyear budgets? 
2 12 COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS 
212A Are there reporting procedures requiring the submission of information by individual members 
pertaining to regime implementation? 
212B Are there procedures for reviewing implementation formally or not formally established in the 
regime's constitutive provisions? 
212C What formal compliance mechanisms are provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions to 
achieve compliance? 
212D What compliance mechanisms not provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions are used to 
achieve compliance? 
212E Do these procedures generally reflect an enforcement approach or a management approach to 
compliance? 
2 13 REGIME'S INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS 
213A Identify other regimes with which this regime interacts. Indicate whether the interaction is 
mutually reinforcing or conflicting. 
2 14 NARRATIVE 
214A Write a short description of the central aspects of the regime's attributes. It is acceptable to repeat 
information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded 
above. List the most important literature used in coding the regime formation part of the data protocol. 
201 STATED AND UNSTATED GOALS 
FORM: RAl 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 201A Does the regime have stated goals? If so, what are the 
most important stated goals of the regime? Identify up to five. 
Stated goals are explicitly mentioned in the regime's constitutive agreements. Such stated 
goals may be set forth in the preamble, or in paragraphs which include the regime's 
principles or major substantive provisions. 
Provide codes for each element. 
GOALS-EXIST Does the regime have stated goals? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = No stated goals exist 
2 = Regime has stated goals 
3 = Don't know 
GOALS If GOALS-EXIST is coded '2' (=Regime has stated goals), 
what are the most important stated goals of the regime? 
Identify up to five. 
GOALS-REFERENCE Give a reference for the stated goals (e.g., treaty or soft law 
document) identified under GOALS. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA2 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 201B Does the regime have unstated goals? Lf so, what are the 
most important unstated goals of the regime? Identify up to five. 
Unstated goals are not explicitly mentioned in the regime's constitutive agreements. But 
regime members can develop common understandings about such goals. Regime members 
may (but need not) refer to such unstated goals in public statements about the purposes of the 
regime (conference statements, press releases, public speeches, governmental/internal docu- 
ments of regime members). 
Provide codes for each element. 
UNSTATED- 
GOALS-EXIST Does the regime have unstated goals? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = No unstated goals exist 
2 = Regime has unstated goals 
3 = Don't know 
UNSTATED-GOALS If UNSTATED-GOALS-EXIST is coded '2' (=Regime has 
unstated goals), what are the most important unstated goals 
of the regime? Identify up to five. 
UNSTATED- 
GOALS-REFERENCE Give a reference for the unstated goals identified under 
UNSTATED-GOALS (e.g., conference statements, press 
releases, public speeches, governmental/internal documents 
of regime members). 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
202 LARGER VISION OR THEORY 
FORM: RA3 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 202A Does the regime reflect some larger vision or theory 
regarding the organization and operation of international society? 
Provide codes for each element. 
VISION-INTERNATIONAL- 
SOCIETY Does the regime reflect some larger vision or theory 
regarding the organization and operation of international 
society? Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention 
other visions. 
0 = There is no larger vision or theory 
1 = State-centric: The regime treats states to be the main actors. The regime emphasizes 
principles like state sovereignty (e.g., sovereignty over natural resources, responsibility not to 
cause damage to the environment of other states or to areas beyond national jurisdiction) or 
noninterference as the most important features determining state relationships. 
2 = Kantian society of states: The regime reflects the conviction that interstate relationships 
should be based on an international society governed by law (e.g., principles about good 
neighbourliness and international cooperation). 
3 = Global civil society: The regime considers non-state actors and individuals to be important 
actors. The regime emphasizes the importance of realizing specific needs and rights of 
individuals (e.g., preservation of human rights). 
4 = Don't know 
5 = Mention other visions, if applicable. 
VISION-ELABORATE If one or more visions are checked under 
VISION-INTERNATIONAL_SOCIETY, elaborate on each 
of these larger visions and theories in a paragraph. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
203 OVERALL CHARACTERISTICS 
FORM: RA4 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 203A Is the regime an explicit or a tacit regime? 
Provide codes for each element. 
EXPLICIT-TACIT Is the regime an explicit or a tacit regime? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Explicit regime: The term "explicit regime" refers to classic arrangements in which rules 
are stated formally, actors refer to them regularly, and rule-consistent behavior is widespread. 
The study of explicit regimes currently constitutes the core of regime analysis. A well-known 
case in point is the GAIT regime. 
2 = Tacit regime: The term "tacit regime" refers to those cases in which regular but informal 
references to informal rules are common and behavior is consistent with some independently 
inferred rules. The balance of power system in nineteenth-century Europe and the system of 
spheres of influence among the superpowers after World War I1 are examples of this type of 
regime. 
3 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA5 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 203B To what extent is the regime an internal or an external 
regime? 
Provide codes for each element. 
INTERNAL-EXTERNAL To what extent is the regime an internal or an external 
regime? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very strongly an internal regime: The regime serves mainly to increase the utility of regime 
members in absolute terms (e.g., the GAIT regime). 
2 = Strongly an internal regime: Although the regime serves mainly to increase the utility of the 
regime members in absolute terms, it also contains some elements designed to improve the 
positions of members relative to non-members. 
3 = Mixed type (internal and external): The regime contains elements of both types to a nearly 
equal extent (internal and external). 
4 = Strongly an external regime: Although the regime seeks mainly to improve the positions of 
members relative to non-members, it also contains some elements designed to increase the 
utility of the regime members in absolute terms. 
5 = Very strongly an external regime: The regime seeks mainly to improve the positions of 
members relative to non-members (e.g., military alliances, COCOM-Regime). 
6 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA6 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 203C Do the principles and norms of the regime apply only to 
members as such, or are members responsible for ensuring that these provisions are complied 
with by other actors operating within their jurisdiction? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PRINCIPLES-APPLY Do the principles and norms of the regime apply only to 
members as such, or are members responsible for ensuring 
that these provisions are complied with by other actors 
operating within their jurisdiction? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Principleslnorms apply only to the behavior of the members as such (If states are members, 
components of the public sector, like the army, government agencies, etc. are included) 
2 = Members are also responsible for applying these provisions to other actors operating within 
their jurisdiction (e.g., members are responsible for applying the MARPOL provisions to tanker 
owners and operators) 
3 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA7 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 203D Can the regime's principles be characterized in terms of 
the three fundamental types of property rights/allocation rules? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROPERTY-TY PES Can the regime's principles be characterized in terms of the 
three fundamental types of property rights/allocation rules? 
0 = Not applicable (Impossible to characterize the regime's principles in terms of property 
rightslallocation rules) 
I = Internationalization: An international authority manages the mode of production and 
determines allocation of the shares and their allocation among the member states. 
2 = Nationalization: The allocation of the resource is managed by states. 
3 = Free access and exchange: Only market forces control the allocation of the resource. 
4 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
204 PRINCIPLES AND NORMS 
FORM: RA8 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 204A Identify the most important regime-specific principles and 
norms. Mention whether the constitutive agreements make explicit reference to each principle 
or norm, or whether the commitment is implicit. 
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Regimes can mandate a principled (as 
opposed to a practical) differentiation of roles among the members (e.g., flag vs. port vs. 
coastal states). John Ruggie has developed an interpretation of multilateralism that - 
emphasizes the underlying principle of cooperation rather than the number of participants 
involved. Multilateralism, by this account, describes institutions that build on (a) 
antidiscrimination as a generalized principle of conduct, (b) the principle of indivisibility, 
and (c) the principle of diffuse reciprocity, where these elements are treated as an indivisible 
ensemble. 
Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations (e.g., noninter- 
ference, compliance, financial and technology transfer, assessment/amendment and adjust- 
ment of regime provisions, protection of single species/environmental goods, etc.). To 
illustrate, it is possible to classify regimes in terms of goal orientation. We can distinguish 
regimes that serve mainly to increase the utility of regime participants in absolute terms 
(internal regimes), from those that seek to improve the position of members relative to 
outsiders (external regimes). A related distinction separates open institutions (e.g., the United 
Nations), conditionally open institutions (e.g., IMF, GATT), and institutions with restricted 
membership (e.g., NATO, OPEC, EU). 
Provide codes for each element. 
PRINCIPLE-NORM Identify the most important regime-specific principles and 
norms. Check as many as apply. If relevant, list up to ten 
additional principles and norms. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Precautionary principle: Provides a basis for the early development of new international law 
to address environmental risks even if scientific knowledge about the causes of the problem is 
still incomplete (e.g., the precautionary principle is explicitly mentioned in the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol of the ozone regime). 
2 = Polluter pays: The principle that costs arising from pollution and from measures to prevent 
pollution should be borne by the actor(s) responsible for causing the pollution and the costs. 
3 = Sovereignty: A general principle that states act as independent and equal actors. 
4 = Sovereignty over natural resources: States have (within certain limits) the right to conduct 
or authorize such activities as they choose within their territories, including activities that may 
have adverse effects on their own environment. 
5 = Responsibility not to cause damage to environment: Responsibility not to cause damage to 
the environment of other states or to areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
6 = Principle of preventive action: There is an obligation to prevent damage to the environ- 
ment, or to reduce, limit, or control activities that might cause such damage. 
7 = Good neighborliness and international cooperation: A general obligation to cooperate in the 
issue area, with regard to specific problems of the regime (e.g., implementation of the regime's 
provisions), or with regard to specific commitments. 
8 = Common concern: The principle emphasizing the common concern about the consequences 
of an environmental problem (e.g., the biodiversity convention states that "biodiversity is a 
common concern of humankind"). 
9 = Common heritage of manhnd: The principle that certain "international commons" are the 
common heritage of mankind. 
10 = Intergenerational equity: The principle emphasizing the responsibility of members of 
present generations for future generations. 
I1 = Equitable use of natural resources: A general principle calling for equity between states 
that are at different economic levels, that have different environmental and developmental 
needs, and that contribute in different degrees to particular problems. 
12 = Sustainable use of natural resources: The principle focusing on the adoption of standards 
governing the rate of use or exploitation of specific natural resources. The principle was 
developed originally to govern the exploitation of marine species (e.g., to limit catches to 
"maximum sustainable levels" for species such as whales, tuna, North Pacific fish). 
13 = Integration of environment and development: The commitment to integrate environmental - 
aspects into economic development and to consider economic and social needs in determining 
and implementing rules for environmental protection. 
14 = Don't know 
15 = If relevant, list up to 10 additional principles and norms. 
PRINCIPLE- 
NORM-EXPLICIT For each principlelnorm checked and listed under 
PRINCIPLE-NORM, state whether the constitutive agree- 
ments make explicit reference to the principlelnorm or 
whether the commitment is implicit. 
0 = Not applicable 
I = Constitutive agreements make explicit reference to principlelnorm 
2 = Commitment to principlelnorm is implicit 
3 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
205 REGIME RULES 
FORM: RA9 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 205A What are the substantive rules or prescriptions of the 
regime? Indicate whether the constitutive agreements make explicit reference to the rules. 
Rules are well-defined guides for action or standards setting forth actions that subjects are 
expected to perform (or to refrain from performing) under specific circumstances. They include 
prohibitions, requirements, and permissions. Any given rule comprises an indication of the 
relevant subject group, a behavioral prescription, and a specification of the circumstances under - 
which the rule is operative. 
Consider only substantive rules and separate them from procedural rules dealing with the 
operation of the regime (e.g., dispute settlement, compliance mechanisms, implementation 
review mechanisms, decisionmaking), which will be coded elsewhere. 
Provide codes for each element. 
RULES What are the substantive rules or prescriptions of the regime? 
For each element, identify up to 20 of the most important 
rules. 
RULE-TY PE For each rule mentioned under RULES, code whether the 
constitutive agreements make explicit reference to it or 
whether it is implicit. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Constitutive agreements make explicit reference to rule 
2 = Commitment to rule is implicit 
3 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RAlO 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 205B Is it possible to categorize the regime's substantive rules 
as requirements, prohibitions, or permissions? 
Provide codes for each element. 
RULE-CATEGORY For each rule listed under RULES, code whether it is a 
requirement rule, prohibition rule, or permission rule. 
0 = Not applicable: Not possible to categorize the rule as requirement, prohibition, or 
permission. 
1 = Requirement rule: Spells out an action or outcome (or its negation) that is obligatory. 
2 = Prohibition rule: Spells out an action or outcome (or its negation) that is forbidden. 
3 = Permission rule: Grants permission but neither forbids nor requires an action. Permission 
rules need not be laid down as written formulations. 
4 = Don't know 
RULES Substantive rules or prescriptions of the regime listed above. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RAll  
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 205C Are the regime's substantive rules legally binding on the 
members, or do they have the character of soft law (e.g., ministerial declarations, codes of 
conduct)? 
Provide codes for each element. 
RULE-BINDING For each rule listed under RULES, code whether it is legally 
binding on the members, or whether it has the character of 
soft law (e.g. ministerial declarations, guidelines, codes of 
conduct). 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Rule is legally binding. 
2 = Rule is soft lawlnot legally binding. 
3 = Don't know 
RULES Substantive rules or prescriptions of the regime listed above. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA12 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 205D Are the regime's substantive rules generally precise and 
easy to interpret in the sense that they call for well-defined actions, or are they ambiguous and 
indeterminate? 
Provide codes for each element. 
RULE-PRECISE For each rule listed under RULES, code whether the rule is 
generally precise and easy to interpret in the sense that they 
call for well-defined actions, or whether it is ambiguous and 
indeterminate. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Precise and easy to interpret (e.g., precise rules for emission reductions to achieve a percent 
reduction goal within a certain time frame and calculated from a base year; rules that require the 
fulfillment of certain economic indicators to achieve membership in the European Monetary 
System by the end of the decade). 
2 = Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3 = Medium (e.g., general exemption clauses specifying certain circumstances under which 
states will not have to fulfill specific obligations. Article XIX in GATT allows a country to 
suspend obligations under conditions causing "serious injury to domestic producers in that 
territory of like or directly competitive products." The contracting country is free, with respect 
to such a product "and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy 
such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part"). 
4 = Between 3 and 5 on the scale. 
5 = Ambiguous and indeterminate (e.g., rules to guarantee "access to appropriate means" for the 
work of journalists). 
6 = Don't know 
RULES Substantive rules or prescriptions of the regime listed above. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA13 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 205E Does the regime have substantive rules that differentiate 
among its members in terms of requirements, prohibitions, or permissions? 
Provide codes for each element. 
RULE-DIFFERENTIATE For each rule listed under RULES, code whether it 
differentiates among its members in terms of requirements, 
prohibitions, or permissions. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Rule does not differentiate among members 
2 = Rule differentiates among members 
3 = Don't know 
DISCUSS- RULE If RULE-DIFFERENTIATE is coded '2' (=rule 
differentiates among members) for a rule listed under 
RLILES, discuss the kind of differentiation among members 
in terms of requirements, prohibitions, or permissions for 
that rule. 
RULES Substantive rules or prescriptions of the regime listed above. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA14 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 205F Is the regime narrow or broad as measured by the 
functional scope of its rules? 
Provide codes for each element. 
RULES-NARROW Is the regime narrow or broad as measured by the functional 
scope of its rules? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Very narrow: The regime has a very limited functional scope compared to the specific 
issues considered necessary for inclusion in the regime and covers only a limited number of 
important issues. For instance, only a very small number of issues are regulated compared to a 
large number considered necessary for inclusion in the regime (e.g., regime includes regulations 
about a single substance contributing to pollution of a transboundary river, but regulations about 
a large number of other substances of similar or even greater importance are lacking; regime for 
conventional arms reductions includes only regulations about a single type or a small number of 
weapons, but other major types of weapons of similar or even greater importance are not 
included). 
2 = Narrow: Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3 = Medium: The regime covers some important issues compared to the range of issues 
considered necessary for inclusion in the regime. For instance, several issues considered 
necessary for inclusion in the regime are regulated (e.g., regime includes regulations about 
several substances contributing to pollution of a transboundary river, but still other important 
pollutants are not regulated; regime for conventional arms reductions includes regulations about 
several types of weapons, but other major weapons are not included). 
4 = Broad: Between 3 and 5 on the scale. 
5 = Very broad: The regime has a very comprehensive functional scope and covers all important 
issues considered necessary for inclusion in the regime (e.g., regime includes regulations about 
all important pollutants contributing to pollution of a transboundary river; regime for 
conventional arms reductions includes regulations about all major types of weapons considered 
necessary for inclusion). 
6 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RAl5 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 205G Is the regime shallow or deep as measured by the density 
and specificity of its rules? 
Provide codes for each element. 
REGIME-SHALLOW Is the regime shallow or deep as measured by the density and 
specificity of its rules? 
1 = Very shallow: Compared to the density of rules considered necessary for managing the 
problems in the issue area, the regime comprises only a very limited number of rules, andlor 
established rules are rather weak compared to the specificity of the rules considered necessary 
for managing the problems in the issue area (e.g. the 1979 Bonn Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals is a very shallow regime with a very 
limited number of weak rules). 
2 = Shallow: Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3 = Medium: Compared to the density of rules considered necessary for managing the problems 
in the issue area, the regime comprises a sizable number of rules to manage the problem andlor 
established rules have developed some strength compared to the specificity of the rules 
considered necessary for managing the problems in the issue area. 
4 = Deep: Between 3 and 5 on the scale. 
5 = Very deep: Compared to the density of rules considered necessary for managing the 
problems in the issue area, the regime comprises a very comprehensive set of rules andlor 
established rules are rather strong compared to the specificity of the rules considered necessary 
for managing the problems in the issue area [e.g., the adjustments and amendments to the 
Montreal Protocol (1987) adopted in London (1990) and Copenhagen (1992) led to a rather 
deep regime with comprehensive and strong rules]. 
6 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
206 PROGRAMS 
FORM: RA16 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 206A Does the regime explicitly call for the conduct of 
programmatic activities? 
Programmatic activities are substantive activities intended to support the regime's operation and 
to promote the implementation of the regime's provisions (e.g., scientific analysis, compliance 
monitoring, verification of compliance, financial and technology transfer, etc.). 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROGRAM-ACTIVITIES Does the regime explicitly call for the conduct of 
programmatic activities? Check as many as apply. Mention 
additional activities, if applicable. 
0 = No programmatic activities 
1 = Scientific monitoring of causes and effects of the problem 
2 = Research about causes and effects of the problem 
3 = Expert advice 
4 = Compliance monitoring 
5 = Review of implementation 
6 = Verification of compliance 
7 = Financial and technology transfer 
8 = Reviewing adequacy of commitments 
9 = Information management 
10 = If applicable, mention additional activities, 
1 1 = Don't know 
PROGRAM-BUDGET Provide data about the size of the budget (including currency 
and year) for those programmatic activities checked or 
mentioned under PROGRAM-ACTIVITIES . 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA17 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 206B If the regime explicitly calls for the conduct of 
programmatic activities, to what extent are those who participate in relevant advisory 
bodies/programmatic activities recognized as experts in the field? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROGRAM-EXPERTS If the regime explicitly calls for the conduct of 
programmatic activities, to what extent are those who 
participate in relevant advisory bodies/programmatic 
activities checked under PROGRAM-ACTIVITIES 
recognized as experts in the field? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = No member of the body is among the top 50 leading experts in the field 
2 = Members of the body include less than 10% of the 50 leading experts in the field 
3 = Members of the body include between 10 and 20% of the top 50 leading experts in the field 
4 = Members of the body include between 20 and 50% of the top 50 leading experts in the field 
5 = Members of the body include more than 50% of the top 50 leading scientists in the field 
6 = Don't know 
PROGRAM-ACTIVITIES Programmatic activities checked or mentioned above. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RAl8 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 206C If the regime explicitly calls for the conduct of 
programmatic activities, who controls participation and the agenda in the bodies carrying out 
programmatic activities? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROGRAM- 
EXPERTS-CONTROL If the regime explicitly calls for the conduct of 
programmatic activities, who controls participation in the 
bodies carrying out programmatic activities checked under 
PROGRAM-ACTIVITIES? For each programmatic activity, 
Check as many as apply. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = No membership control exists 
2 = Political bodies appoint members 
3 = Individuals (like an executive secretary, chairman) appoint members 
4 = Experts appoint members 
5 = Membership is open to experts, without appointment 
6 = Don't know 
PROGRAM- 
EXPERTS-AGENDA If the regime explicitly calls for the conduct of 
programmatic activities, who controls the agenda in the 
bodies carrying out programmatic activities checked under 
PROGRAM- ACTIVITIES? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Political bodies or government officials 
2 = The experts themselves 
3 = Don't know 
PROGRAM-ACTIVITIES Programmatic activities checked or mentioned above 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA19 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 206D Does the regime have de facto programs that differ 
materially from explicitly mandated programs? 
This question aims at de facto programs (in contrast to programs explicitly called for by the 
regime). 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROGRAM- 
DE-FACT0 Does the regime have de facto programs that differ materially 
from explicitly mandated programs? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes 
3 = Don't know 
NARRATIVE- 
PROGRAM-DE-FACT0 If PROGRAM-DE-FACT0 is coded '2' (=yes), elaborate in 
a paragraph. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA20 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 207A How many formal members do the relevant aserrnents 
have? 
Formal membership is limited to actors that have formally signed the regime's constitutive 
agreement. 
Provide codes for each element. 
MEMBERSHIP-SOURCE Indicate where the database team can obtain information about 
the number of formal members of the regme. Indicate, 
whether information provided for a single element fits for 
other elements as well. If so, provide information only once. 
MEMBERSHIP-NUMBER How many formal members do the relevant agreements listed 
under AGREEMENTS have? Indicate the number of formal 
members (including states, international governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations). 
MEMBERSHEYEAR Indicate the year for which MEMBERSHIP- NUMBER is 
valid. 
MEMBERSHIP-ACTOR Identify the members for each agreement listed under 
AGREEMENTS. 
MEMBERSHIP- 
ACTOR-YEAR For each member listed under MEMBERSHIPACTOR, 
indicate year of membership. 
AGREEMENTS Agreements identified in the precoding agreement that are part 
of the regime by name. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA21 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 207B Are there informal members (states or non-state actors that 
have not formally signed the regime's constitutive agreements or otherwise acquired member- 
ship) but that have rights and obligations under the terms of the regime and have a voice in its 
decisionmaking processes? If yes, identify these members. 
This question applies only to explicit regimes. 
Example: Taiwan cannot become a member of regimes to which China belongs, but it plays a 
role as an informal member of some of these regimes. 
Provide codes for each element. 
INFORMAL-MEMBER Are there informal members (states or non-state actors that 
have not formally signed the regime's constitutive agreements 
or otherwise acquired membership) but that have rights and 
obligations under the terms of the regime and have a voice in 
its decisionmaking processes? 
0 = Not applicable (Not an explicit regime) 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes 
3 = Don't know 
INFORMAL-MEMBER- 
STATE If INFORMALMEMBER is coded '2' (=yes), are there states 
that have not formally signed the regime's constitutive 
agreements or otherwise acquired membership but that have 
rights and obligations under the terms of the regime and have a 
voice in its decisionmaking processes? If yes, identify these 
states. 
INFORMALMEMBER- 
NON-STATE If INFORMAL-MEMBER is coded '2' (=yes), are there non- 
state actors that have not formally signed the regime's 
constitutive agreements or otherwise acquired membership but 
that have rights and obligations under the terms of the regime 
and have a voice in its decisionmaking processes? If yes, 
identify these non-state actors. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA22 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 207C Are there state or non-state actors that are important in 
terms of the problem to be solved but that are not members of the regime? 
Include non-state actors only if the regime allows membership of non-state actors. 
Provide codes for each element. 
NON-MEMBER Are there state or non-state actors that are important in terms 
of the problem to be solved but that are not members of the 
regime? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes 
3 = Don't know 
NON-MEMBER-STATE IF NON-MEMBER is coded '2' (=yes), are there states that 
are important in terms of the problem to be solved but that are 
not members of the regime? If yes, identify these states. 
NON-MEMBER- 
NON-STATE IF NON-MEMBER is coded '2' (=yes), are there non-state 
actors that are important in terms of the problem to be solved 
but that are not members of the regime? If yes, identify these 
non-state actors. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA23 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 207D Are there explicit provisions that target activities (e.g., oil 
tanker operators in MARPOL) of non-state actors or that cover the participation of non-state 
actors (e.g., provisions governing observer status for non-state actors in the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna) in the regime? If so, 
elaborate on the nature of the rules in a paragraph. 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROVISIONS-NONSTATE Are there explicit provisions that target activities (e.g., oil 
tanker operators in MARPOL) of non-state actors or that cover 
the participation of non-state actors (e.g., provisions governing 
observer status for non-state actors in the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and 
Fauna) in the regime? If applicable, check more than one 
answer. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 = Explicit provisions targeting activities of non-state actors 
3 = Explicit provisions targeting participation of non-state actors 
4 = Don't know 
RULES-ACTIVITIES If PROVISIONS-NONSTATE is coded '2' (=explicit 
provisions targeting activities of non-state actors), identify 
these rules targeting activities of non-state actors in a 
paragraph. 
RULES-PARTICIPATE If PROVISIONS-NONSTATE is coded '3' (=explicit 
provisions targeting participation of non-state actors), 
identify these rules targeting participation of non-state actors 
in a paragraph. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
208 MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA AND RULES 
FORM: RA24 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 208A What criteria govern eligibility for membership? 
Provide codes for each element. 
MEMBER- 
CRITERIA-STATE What criteria govern eligibility for membership of states? 
Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional 
membership criteria. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = The regime has no membership criteria 
2 = Belonging to a certain continent 
3 = Belonging to a certain region 
4 = Status as a neighboduser of a security/economic/environmental good 
5 = Membership in other international organizations 
6 = Membership in other international regimes 
7 = Polity (e.g., liberal democracy, socialist/cornrnunist state) 
8 = Realization of human rights in countries applying for membership 
9 = Evidence of peaceableness 
10 = Economic indicators (like GNP, GDP, etc.) 
11 = Type of domestic economic system (e.g., market economy, centrally planned economy) 
12 = Specific domestic economic and budgetary policies 
13 = Expertise and work carried out in the issue area 
14 = Potential to help with problem solving in the issue area 
15 = Role as a source of the problem 
16 = If applicable, mention additional membership criteria. 
17 = Don't know 
MEMBER- 
CRITERIA-NONSTATE What criteria govern eligibility for membership of non-state 
actors? Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention 
additional membership criteria (see codes above). 
MEMBER- 
CRITERIA-IGOS What criteria govern eligibility for membership of 
international governmental organizations? Check as many as 
apply. If applicable, mention additional membership criteria 
(see codes above). 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA25 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 208B How many states meet these criteria? 
Provide information for each element. 
NARRATIVE- 
MEMBER-CRITERIA Elaborate on how many states meet these criteria governing 
eligibility for membership (mentioned under 
MEMBER-CRITERIA-STATE). Indicate the year for which 
your statement is valid. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA26 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 208C Do the rules pertaining to the admission of non-founding 
members differ from the admission rules applied to founding or original members? If yes, 
please describe. 
In some regimes, parties wishing to become members after the regime is formed are subject 
to requirements that differ from those applied to the founding members. This may involve 
meeting specified membership tests (e.g., showing that they are peace loving) or living up to 
specific performance standards (e.g., level of effort requirements). 
Provide codes for each element. 
MEMBER- 
CRITERIA-DIFFER Do the rules pertaining to the admission of non-founding 
members differ from the admission rules applied to founding 
or original members? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 =Yes 
3 = Don't know 
NARRATIVE- 
MEMB ER-CRITERIA If MEMBER-CRITERIA-DIFFER is coded '2' (=yes), 
elaborate in a short paragraph how the rules pertaining to the 
admission of non-founding members differ from the 
admission rules applied to founding original members. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA27 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 208D Is there a single category of membership or are there 
provisions establishing more than one category of membership? 
Some regimes provide for categories of membership. The Antarctic Treaty System distinguishes 
between consultative parties and ordinary parties. Only consultative parties, confined to original 
signatories and states undertaking substantial scientific research in Antarctica, have 
decisionmaking authority. Non-consultative parties are states that accede to the Antarctic Treaty 
but do not undertake substantial scientific research. Non-consultative parties do not have any 
formal decisionmaking authority. 
Provide codes for each element. 
MEMBER- 
CATEGORY Is there a single category of membership or are there 
provisions establishing more than one category of member- 
ship? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Single category of membership 
2 = More than one category of membership 
3 = Don't know 
NARRATIVE- 
MEMBER-CATEGORY If MEMBERSHIP-CATEGORY is coded '2' (=more than 
one category of membership), elaborate in a paragraph. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA28 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 208E Do the regime's provisions allow for role differentiation 
among the members? 
The provisions of MARPOL differentiate among flag states, port states, and coastal states. The 
hazardous waste regime distinguishes between exporting and importing states. 
Provide codes for each element. 
MEMBER- 
ROLE-DIFFERENTIATE Do the regime's provisions allow for role differentiation 
among the members? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes 
3 = Don't Know 
NARRATIVE- 
MEMBER-ROLE If MEMBERSHIP-ROLE-DIFFERENTIATE is coded '2' 
(=yes), elaborate in a paragraph. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
209 SECRETARIAT 
FORM: RA29 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 209A Did the members of the regime establish a secretariat for 
the regime as a whole or any of its elements? 
Provide codes only once for the overall issue area, as a secretariat normally performs tasks 
for all regime elements. 
SECRETARIAT Did the members of the regime establish a secretariat for the 
regime as a whole or any of its elements? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = No secretariat established 
2 = Regime has a secretariat of its own operating independently of other organizations (e.g., 
secretariat of the Framework Convention on Climate Change) 
3 = An intergovernmental organization performs the secretariat's functions (e.g., ozone 
secretariat operating under UNEP) 
4 = A nongovernmental organization performs the secretariat's functions [e.g., Article 8 of 
the Ramsar Convention specifies, that "the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
shall perform the continuing bureau duties under this Convention." IUCN is a nongovern- 
mental organization with a membership of 526 nongovernmental organizations, 99 
government agencies, and 62 states (in 1993)l 
5 = A nation state performs the secretariat's functions 
6 = Don't know 
SECRETARIAT- 
IN-OPERATION 
SECRETARIAT- 
ESTABLISHED 
If SECRETARIAT is coded '2' (=regime has a secretariat of 
its own operating independently of other organizations), '3' 
(=an intergovernmental organization performs the secreta- 
riat's functions), '4' (=a nongovernmental organization per- 
forms the secretariat's functions), or '5' (=a nation state per- 
forms the secretariat's functions), indicate year(s) when the 
secretariat was in operation. Indicate, if there was a break of 
the secretariat's operation. 
If SECRETARIAT is coded '2' (=regime has a secretariat of 
its own operating independently of other organizations), '3' 
(=an intergovernmental organization performs the secreta- 
riat's functions), '4' (=a nongovernmental organization per- 
forms the secretariat's functions), or '5' (=a nation state per- 
forms the secretariat's functions), indicate year when the 
secretariat was established. 
SECRETARIAT-STAFF If SECRETARIAT is coded '2' (=regime has a secretariat of 
its own operating independently of other organizations), '3' 
(=an intergovernmental organization performs the secreta- 
riat's functions), '4' (=a nongovernmental organization per- 
forms the secretariat's functions), or '5' (=a nation state per- 
forms the secretariat's functions), what is the size of the 
secretariat's staff? 
SECRETARIAT- 
STAFF-Y EAR 
SECRETARIAT- 
BUDGET 
Indicate year for which SECRETARIAT- STAFF is valid. 
If SECRETARIAT is coded '2' (=regime has a secretariat of 
its own operating independently of other organizations), '3' 
(=an intergovernmental organization performs the secre- 
tariat's functions), '4' (=a nongovernmental organization 
performs the secretariat's functions), or '5' (=a nation state 
performs the secretariat's functions), what is the size of the 
secretariat's budget? Indicate number and currency. 
SECRETARIAT- 
BUDGET-YEAR Indicate year for which SECRETARIAT- BUDGET is valid. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA30 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 209B How independent is the secretariat from the regime's 
members? 
Determine the independence of the secretariat according to the latitude the secretariat has 
when performing its core tasks (e.g., arranging and servicing meetings of the Conference of 
the Parties and subsidiary bodies; performing the functions assigned by legal documents; 
preparing and transmitting reports based on information received from the Conference of the 
Parties and subsidiary bodies; preparing reports on secretariat implementation activities for 
the Conference of the Parties; ensuring coordination with relevant international bodies and 
NGOs; liaising/cornrnunicating with relevant authorities, non-parties, and international 
organizations; compiling and analyzing datalinformation; monitoring adherence to treaty 
obligations; giving guidance and advice to the parties; and consulting/assisting) as well as 
when performing additional tasks or roles (e.g., its political role as pusher or laggard for 
regime evolution/ratification/compliance, its promotion of treaty to non-parties, public 
relations, its influence on the agenda of the regime, etc.). 
Provide codes only once for the overall issue area, as a secretariat normally performs tasks 
for all regime elements. 
SECRETARIAT- 
INDEPENDENCE How independent is the secretariat from the regime's 
members? 
0 = Not applicable (no secretariat exists) 
1 = Highly independent: The secretariat has broad latitude to take action independent of 
member approval. Most of the important actions do not need state approval. 
2 = Strong independence: Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3 = Some independence: The secretariat has some latitude to take action with regard to some, 
but not all, important issues. 
4 = Less independent: Between 3 and 5 on the scale. 
5 = No independence: The secretariat has no latitude to take independent action. All action 
taken by the secretariat must have state approval. 
6 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
210 DECISIONMAKING 
FORM: RA31 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210A What types of formal decisions are made by the regime? 
Distinguish between decisions called for in the formal provisions of the regime and decisions 
made but not formally called for by the regime's constitutive provisions. 
Provide codes for each element. 
DECISIONS-PROVIDED What types of formal decisions are called for by the 
constitutive provisions of the regime? Check as many as 
apply. If applicable, mention additional decisions. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Establish and revise substantive rules 
2 = Apply rules 
3 = Amend or extend core constitutive document 
4 = Admit new members 
5 = Expel members 
6 = Accept withdrawal of members 
7 = Terminate the regime 
8 = Resolve disputes 
9 = If applicable, mention additional decisions. 
10 = Don't know 
DECISIONS- 
CARRIED-OUT What types of formal decisions are made as called for by the 
constitutive provisions and mentioned under 
DECISIONS-PROVIDED. Check as many as apply. If 
applicable, mention additional decisions (see codes above). 
DECISIONS- 
OTHER-MEANS What types of decisions are made but not formally called for 
by the regime's constitutive provisions? Check as many as 
apply. If applicable, mention additional decisions (see codes 
above). 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA32 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210B What decision rules does the regime provide for and use 
in arriving at decisions? 
There is a difference between having written decision rules which are part of the regime's 
provisions and using decision rules for arriving at these decisions (e.g., the regime's 
provisions can provide for a qualified majority, whereas in practice states try to arrive at 
these decisions by consensus). 
Provide codes for each element. 
DECISION-RULES- 
PROVIDED What decision rules does the regime provide for in arriving 
at decisions? Code each decision listed under 
DECISIONS-PROVIDED. For each decision, check as 
many as apply. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = No decision rules 
2 = Unanimity 
3 = Consensus 
4 = Weightedlunweighted voting 
5 = Qualified majority 
6 = Simple majority 
7 = Right to opt-out, file objection 
8 = Don't know 
DECISION-RULES- 
IN-PRACTICE What decision rules does the regime use in practice in 
arriving at decisions? Code each decision listed under 
DECISIONS-PROVIDED (see codes above). 
DECISIONS-PROVIDED Formal decisions called for by the constitutive provisions of 
the regime listed above. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA33 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210C What decisionmaking bodies are provided for in the 
regime? 
There is a difference between bodies that participate in decisionmaking and bodies that make 
final decisions. Identify both types of decisionmalung bodies, if they are explicitly provided 
for in the regime. Note, that this question does not include external decisionmaking bodies. 
Provide codes for each element. 
BODIES-PROVIDED What decisionmaking bodies are provided for in the regime? 
Identify as many as apply. Mention name of each body. 
BODY-TYPE Indicate the body type for each decisionmaking body listed 
under BODIES-PROVIDED. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Regular meeting of conference of parties 
2 = Ad hoc meetings of conference of parties 
3 = Standing subsidiary body 
4 = Ad hoc subsidiary body 
5 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA34 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210D How do these bodies participate in decisionmaking? Is 
participation by these bodies carried out in accordance with the constitutive provisions of the 
regime? 
There is a difference between how the regime provides for participation of the bodies in 
decisionmaking and whether their participation is carried out in accordance with the regime 
provisions. 
Provide codes for each element. 
PARTICIPATION- 
PROVIDED How do these bodies listed under BODIES-PROVIDED 
participate in decisionmaking? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Regime provides for participation in decisionmaking 
2 = Regime provides for participation in decisionmaking and to make final decisions 
3 = Don't know 
PARTICIPATION- 
ACCORDANCE Is participation by these bodies listed under 
BODIES-PROVIDED carried out in accordance with the 
provisions of the regime? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Body participates in accordance with the provisions of the regime 
2 = Body does not participate in accordance with the provisions of the regime 
3 = Don't know 
BODIES-PROVIDED Decisionmaking bodies provided for in the regime listed 
above. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA35 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210E Are there other bodies within the regime that play a role 
in decisionmaking but are not explicitly provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions? 
How do these bodies participate in decisionmaking? 
This question does not include external decisionmaking bodies. 
Provide codes for each element. 
B ODIES-OTHER Are there other bodies within the regime that play a role in 
decisionmaking but are not explicitly provided for in the 
regime's constitutive provisions? If so, mention name of 
each body. 
BODY-TYPE Indicate the body type for each decisionmaking body listed 
under BODIES-OTHER. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Regular meeting of conference of parties 
2 = Ad hoc meetings of conference of parties 
3 = Standing subsidiary body 
4 = Ad hoc subsidiary body 
5 = Don't know 
PARTICIPATION-OTHER How do these bodies listed under BODIES-OTHER 
participate in decisionmaking? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Body participates in decisionmaking 
2 = Body participates in decisionmaking and makes final decisions 
3 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA36 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210F Does the regime formally or informally delegate 
decisionmaking power to any external bodies? 
Provide codes for each element. 
DELEGATE-DECISIONS Does the regime formally or informally delegate 
decisionmaking power to any external bodies? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes 
3 = Don't know 
EXTERNAL-BODIES If DELEGATE-DECISIONS is coded '2' (=yes), 1 ist the 
external bodies that have decisionmaking power for the 
regime. 
EXTERNAL-LOCATION Indicate if the bodies mentioned under 
EXTERNAL-BODIES are part of an international 
governmental organization (IGO), international 
nongovernmental organization (INGO), or another regime. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Not part of any IGO, INGO or another regime 
2 = Body is part of an IGO 
3 = Body is part of an INGO 
4 = Body is part of another regime 
5 = Body is part of an IGO and another regime 
6 = Body is part of an INGO and another regime 
7 = Body is part of an IGO and an INGO 
8 = Body is part of an IGO, INGO and another regime 
9 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA37 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210G How do the external bodies to which the regime 
informally or formally delegated decisionmaking power participate in decisionmaking? 
Provide codes for each element. 
PARTICIPATION-OTHER How do these bodies listed under EXTERNAL-BODIES 
participate in decisionmaking? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Body participates in decisionmaking 
2 = Body participates in decisionmaking and makes final decisions 
3 = Don't know 
EXTERNAL-BODIES External bodies with decisionmaking power for the regime 
listed above. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA38 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210H Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting 
the issues that get on the decisionmaking agenda of bodies explicitly provided for by the 
regime? 
Provide codes for each element. 
SUBSTANTIVE- 
RESTRICTIONS Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the 
issues that get on the decisionmaking agenda of bodies 
explicitly provided for by the regime listed under 
BODIES-PROVIDED? For each body, check as many as 
apply. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = No restrictions 
2 = Issues are restricted according to explicit criteria 
3 = Any member can put item on agenda 
4 = There is a voting procedure for adding items to the agenda 
5 = There is a decisionmaking procedure for adding items to the agenda (e.g., approval of 
several other bodies) 
6 = The agenda is controlled by another regime body 
7 = Don't know 
BODIES-PROVIDED Decisionmaking bodies provided for in the regime listed 
above. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA39 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 2101 Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting 
the issues that get on the decisionmaking agenda of bodies not explicitly provided for by the 
regime? 
Provide codes for each element. 
SUBSTANTIVE- 
RESTRICTIONS Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the 
issues that get on the decisionmaking agenda of bodies not 
explicitly provided for by the regime listed under 
BODIES-OTHER? For each body, check as many as apply. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = No restrictions 
2 = Issues are restricted according to explicit criteria 
3 = Any member can put item on agenda 
4 = There is a voting procedure for adding items to the agenda 
5 = There is a decisionmaking procedure for adding items to the agenda (e.g., approval of 
several other bodies) 
6 = The agenda is controlled by another regime body 
7 = Don't know 
BODIES-OTHER Other bodies within the regime that play a role in 
decisionmaking but are not explicitly provided for in the 
regime's constitutive provisions. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA40 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 2105 Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the 
issues that get on the decisionmaking agenda of external bodies to which the regime formally or 
informally delegates decisionmaking power? 
Provide codes for each element. 
SUBSTANTIVE- 
RESTRICTIONS Are there substantive or procedural restrictions affecting the 
issues that get on the decisionmaking agenda of bodies not 
explicitly provided for by the regime listed under 
EXTERNAL-BODIES? For each body, check as many as 
apply. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = No restrictions 
2 = Issues are restricted according to explicit criteria 
3 = Any member can put item on agenda 
4 = There is a voting procedure for adding items to the agenda 
5 = There is a decisionmaking procedure for adding items to the agenda (e.g., approval of 
several other bodies) 
6 = The agenda is controlled by another regime body 
7 = Don't know 
EXTERNAL-BODIES External bodies with decisionmaking power for the regime 
listed above. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA41 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210K In a short paragraph describe the essential features of the 
regime's decisionmaking bodies as well as their interactions with each other. 
Provide information for each element. 
NARRATIVE-BODIES In a short paragraph describe the essential features of the 
regime's decisionmaking bodies as well as their interactions 
with each other. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
21 1 FUNDING MECHANISMS 
FORM: RA42 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 211A How are the regime's activities and administrative 
operations (including the work of the secretariat) funded? 
Answer this question only, where applicable. For example, if there is no difference between 
the funding of activities and administration of the regime as a whole and its different 
components, provide information only for the regime as a whole (e.g. for the core constitutive 
agreement). 
FUNDING-ACTIVITIES How are the regime's activities and administrative 
operations (including the work of the secretariat) funded? 
Check as many as apply. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Regime does not rely on contributions, assessments, or a distinct source of revenues 
2 = Regime has its own distinct source of revenues 
3 = Regime relies on assessments on members 
4 = Regime relies on voluntary contributions 
5 = Regime relies on mixed financing through assessments as well as voluntary contributions 
6 = Regime relies on national contributions through use of national facilities 
7 = Regime relies on in kind contributions 
8 = National activities financed nationally contribute to international activities of the regime 
9 = Don't know 
FUNDING-NARRATIVE In a short paragraph explain the answer given under 
FUNDING-ACTIVITIES. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA43 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 211B How are the programmatic activities of the regime 
funded? 
Provide codes for each element. 
FUNDING-PROGRAM How are the programmatic activities of the regime listed 
under PROGRAM-ACTIVITIES funded? For each pro- 
grammatic activity, check as many as apply. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Regime does not rely on contributions, assessments, or distinct source of revenues 
2 = Regime has its own distinct source of revenues 
3 = Regime relies on assessments on members 
4 = Regime relies on voluntary contributions 
5 = Regime relies on mixed financing through assessments as well as voluntary contributions 
6 = Regime relies on national contributions through use of national facilities 
7 = Regime relies on in kind contributions 
8 = National activities financed nationally contribute to international activities of the regime 
9 = Don't know 
PROGRAM-ACTIVITIES Programmatic activities checked or mentioned above. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA44 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 21 1C What kinds of financial mechanisms have been created 
under the regime? Does the regime make use of annual or multiyear budgets? 
Answer this question only, where applicable. For example, if there is no difference between 
the funding of activities and administration of the regime as a whole and its different 
components, provide information only for the regime as a whole (e.g. for the core constitutive 
agreement). If there is a single budget for the regime as a whole including the regime's 
components, provide information only for the regime as a whole (e.g. for the core constitutive 
agreement). However, if there are differences between the components of the regime with 
regard to annual or multiyear budgets, provide codes for each element. 
FINANCIAL- 
MECHANISMS What kinds of financial mechanisms have been created 
under the regime? Check as many as apply. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = There are no formal or informal financial mechanisms 
2 = Trust fund or similar mechanism to support the regime's administration 
3 = Trust fund or similar mechanism to support the regime's administration and national 
participation of developing countries 
4 = Trust fund or similar financial mechanism to compensate states for certain activities in 
the international/global interest (e.g., protection of UNESCO World Heritage sites within 
their territory) 
5 = Trust fund or similar financial mechanism to subsidize national compliance (e.g., to 
finance 'incremental costs' for developing countries to meet their obligations under the 
Montreal Protocol, the Climate Change Convention and the Biodiversity Convention) 
6 = Trust fund or similar mechanism to protect resources that remain under national 
sovereignty (e.g., Rain Forest Trust Fund for the Amazon) 
7 = Don't know 
BUDGET-ANNUAL Does the regime make use of annual or multiyear budgets? 
0 = Not applicable (e.g., no budget is necessary for the regime) 
1 = Annual budgets 
2 = Multiyear budgets 
3 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
212 COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS 
FORM: RA45 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 212A Are there reporting procedures requiring the submission of 
information by individual members pertaining to regime implementation? 
Provide codes for each element. 
COMPLIANCE- 
REPORTING 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 =Yes 
3 = Don't know 
Are there reporting procedures requiring the submission of 
information by individual members pertaining to regime 
implementation? 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA46 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 212B Are there procedures for reviewing implementation 
formally or not formally established in the regime's constitutive provisions? 
Distinguish between formal procedures provided for by the regime and procedures carried 
out but not formally established in the regime's constitutive provisions. If applicable, 
mention additional formal procedures for reviewing implementation. 
Provide codes for each element. 
REVIEWS Are there procedures for reviewing implementation formally 
or not formally established in the regime's constitutive 
provisions? Check as many as apply. Identify additional 
review procedures, if applicable. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = There are no explicit review procedures 
2 = Information gathering for broad assessment without evaluating performance/compliance 
of individual parties 
3 = Information from third parties on implementation by other parties 
4 = Information gathering for assessment of performance and compliance of individual 
parties 
5 = Review and broad assessment of the regime by the supreme decisionmaking body 
6 = Review and broad assessment of the regime by bodies delegated by parties to make 
decisions or recommendations 
7 = Review of member performance/compliance by the supreme decisionmaking body 
8 = Review of member performance/compliance by bodies delegated by parties to make 
decisions or recommendations 
9 = Recommendation/implementation of responses to inadequate performance by the 
supreme decisionmaking body 
10 = Recommendation/implementation of responses to inadequate performance by bodies 
delegated by parties 
11 = On-site inspections to verify compliance 
12 = Identify additional review procedures, if applicable 
13 = Don't know 
PROVIDED- 
CARRIED-OUT For each review procedure listed under REVIEWS, indicate 
whether the review procedure is carried out as formally 
provided for by the regime, the review procedure is not 
carried out although formally provided for by the regime, or 
the review procedure is carried out although not formally 
provided for by the regime. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Review procedure is carried out as formally provided for by the regime 
2 = Review procedure is not carried out although formally provided for by the regime 
3 = Review procedure is carried out although not formally provided for by the regime 
4 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA47 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 212C What formal compliance mechanisms are provided for in 
the regime's constitutive provisions to achieve compliance? 
Answer this question only for formal compliance mechanisms provided for in the regime's 
constitutive provisions. 
Provide codes for each element. 
COMPLIANCE What formal compliance mechanisms are provided for in the 
regime's constitutive provisions to achieve compliance? 
Check as many as apply. Identify additional formal 
compliance mechanisms, if applicable. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = No compliance mechanisms 
2 = Issuance of notices of violations 
3 = Suspension of membership rights 
4 = Exclusion from membership 
5 = Imposition of military punishments 
6 = Imposition of financial/economic punishments 
7 = Support for capacity building to enhance compliance 
8 = Granting of a transition period to achieve compliance 
9 = Dissolution of linkages 
10 = Identify additional compliance mechanisms, if applicable 
11 = Don't know 
PROVIDED- 
CARRIED-OUT For each compliance mechanism listed under 
COMPLIANCE, indicate whether the compliance 
mechanism is carried out as formally provided for in the 
regime's constitutive provisions or the compliance 
mechanism is not carried out although formally provided for 
in the regime's constitutive provisions. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Compliance mechanism is carried out as formally provided for by the regime 
2 = Compliance mechanism is not carried out although formally provided for by the regime 
3 = Don't know 
NARRATIVE- 
COMPLIANCE If applicable, elaborate on these compliance mechanisms 
provided for in the regime's constitutive provisions in a 
paragraph. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA48 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 212D What compliance mechanisms not provided for in the 
regime's constitutive provisions are used to achieve compliance? 
Answer this question only for compliance mechanisms carried out but not provided for in the 
regime's constitutive provisions. 
Provide codes for each element. 
COMPLIANCE- 
OTHER-MEANS What compliance mechanisms not provided for in the 
regime's constitutive provisions are used to achieve 
compliance? Check as many as apply. Identify additional 
compliance mechanisms, if applicable. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = No compliance mechanisms 
2 = Threat of issuance of notices of violations 
3 = Issuance of notices of violations 
4 = Threat of suspension of membership rights 
5 = Suspension of membership rights 
6 = Threat of exclusion from membership 
7 = Exclusion from membership 
8 = Threat of military punishments 
9 = Imposition of military punishments 
10 = Threat of financial/economic punishments 
1 1 = Imposition of financial/economic punishments 
12 = Support for capacity building to enhance compliance 
13 = Granting of a transition period to achieve compliance 
14 = Dissolution of linkages 
15 = Shaming 
16 = Identify additional compliance mechanisms, if applicable 
17 = Don't know 
NARRATIVE- 
COMPLIANCE-OTHER If applicable, elaborate on these compliance mechanisms 
carried out but not provided for in the regime's constitutive 
provisions. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RA49 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 212E Do these procedures generally reflect an enforcement 
approach or a management approach to compliance? 
An enforcement approach focuses on measures to pressure violators to comply (e.g., 
punishments, sanctions). A management approach shifts attention to sources of 
noncompliance that can be managed by routine international political processes. In such 
cases, the regime's provisions will contain noncompliance procedures to cope with 
ambiguous behavior and dispute settlement procedures to cope with ambiguous rules. The 
capacity problem will be managed by offering technical and financial assistance. Parties will 
make serious efforts to persuade violators to comply, rather than using coercive measures. 
Provide codes for each element. 
COMPLIANCE-APPROACH Do these procedures generally reflect an enforcement 
approach or a management approach to compliance? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Enforcement approach 
2 = Management approach 
3 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
213 REGIME'S INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER 
INSTITUTIONS 
FORM: RA50 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 213A Identify other regimes with which this regime interacts. 
Indicate whether the interaction is mutually reinforcing or conflicting. 
Provide information for each element. 
REGIME-INTERACTION Identify other regimes with which this regime interacts. 
INTERACTION-TYPE For each regime listed under REGIME-INTERACTION, 
indicate whether the interaction is mutually reinforcing or 
conflicting. 
1 = Interaction is reinforcing 
2 = Interaction is conflicting 
3 = Interaction is reinforcing and conflicting 
4 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
214 NARRATIVE 
FORM: RA51 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 214A Write a short description of the central aspects of the 
regime's attributes. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It 
is also appropriate to include information not coded above. List the most important literature 
used in coding the regime formation part of the data protocol. 
Provide information for each element. 
NARRATIVE- 
ATTRIBUTES Write a short description of the central aspects of the 
regime's attributes. It is acceptable to repeat information 
coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to 
include information not coded above. 
ATTRIBUTES- 
LITERATURE List the most important literature used for coding the regime 
attributes part of the data protocol (If possible, indicate 
author(s), editor(s), book title, article, and year). 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 

PART I11 
Regime Consequences 
PART I11 - TABLE OF CONTENTS 
30 1 OUTPUTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
301A Are the regime-wide bodies that are called for by the regime's constitutive agreements in 
operation? If so, do these regime-wide organizational arrangements produce authoritative decisions on 
a regular or as-needed basis? 
301B What kinds of authoritative decisions about principles, norms, rules and programmatic activities 
are made by the regime? 
302 MEMBER-LEVEL OUTPUTS 
302A Have the important members taken steps to translate the international commitments of the 
agreements into domestic obligations? 
302B In a paragraph, elaborate on the political dynamics involved in these outputs. 
303 ACTOR-LEVEL OUTCOMES 
303A Does the behavior of important actors generally conform with the provisions of the regime? Did 
the regime exert a causal influence on these developments? 
303B What types of events and actions were significant elements of the processes through which the 
regime affected outcomes? Which of these processes played significant roles in the regime's causal 
impact? 
303C Did the regime have behavioral effects that were not explicitly called for in its constitutive 
provisions? If so, please describe these effects and the mechanisms that caused them. 
303D Has the operation of the regime directly or indirectly affected the behavior of various social 
groups of important actors (e.g., car drivers, power plant operators, builders of pollution abatement 
facilites, private firms, ethnic groups, arms producers)? 
303E Specify the important nations in which the behavior of these groups was especially affected. 
Indicate the extent to which the behavior of these groups was affected by the operation of the regime. 
303F Taken together, did the behavioral changes lead to the fulfillment of the stated and/or unstated 
goals of the regime? What causal impact did the regime have in producing these changes? 
304 IMPACTS OF THE REGIME IN THE TARGETED ISSUE AREA 
304A How did the state of the world change during this period with respect to the problems addressed 
by the regime? Did the regime exert a causal influence on these developments? 
304B Did the understanding of the nature of the problem change within important nations? How much 
of this change is attributable to the operation of the regime? 
304C Did the information about the options available for tackling the problem change within important 
states? How much of this change is attributable to the operation of the regime? 
304D Did the operation of the regime lead to increases in the capacities of member states to participate 
effectively in social practices at the international level? If so, elaborate in a paragraph. 
304E How are the benefits arising from the operation of the regime distributed among members? In a 
paragraph, describe the nature of the distribution and identify a few illustrative states that received 
different benefits. 
304F How are the costs associated with the operation of the regime distributed among members? In a 
paragraph, describe the nature of the distribution and identify a few illustrative states that incurred 
different costs. 
304G Describe the relationship between the distribution of costs and benefits. 
305 BROADER CONSEOUENCES OF THE REGIME 
305A Did the regime influence relations between members and non-members? If so, please describe. 
305B Did the operation of the regime produce demonstration effects leading to the creation of new 
international regimes or influencing the evolution of existing international regimes in other issue areas? 
If so, please describe. 
305C Has the regime changed the contents of the international political agenda or the priority of issues 
included on this agenda? 
305D Has the regime affected overall relations among the participating states? 
305E Has the regime affected the character of international society? 
306 NARRATIVE 
306A Write a short description of the central aspects of the regime consequences. It is acceptable to 
repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not 
coded above. List the most important literature used in coding the regime consequences part of the data 
protocol. 
Introduction - Part I11 
This section covers issues often discussed under a number of separate headings, including 
implementation, compliance, and effectiveness. For ease of exposition, it makes use of the 
distinction among outputs, outcomes, impacts, and broader consequences. As the time frame for 
considering regime consequences is open-ended, it is expected that answers to many questions 
in this category will change over time. It is therefore important to focus on questions about 
change. Two additional features of this section should be kept in mind. First, questions about 
consequences are not confined to purely descriptive matters. To some extent, we are interested 
in recording coders' causal judgments. Second, given that regime analysis has only recently 
moved into the area of regime consequences, the categories used here are still debated and are 
less clearly defined than those in the formation section. As a result, the questions are more open 
ended and keywords or proposed answers are less established. 
Output: At the international level, the output dimension refers to the activities involved in 
activating a regime's provisions and decisionmaking procedures (regimes bodies). After the 
negotiation and the signing of an agreement, states must take steps to put the regime's 
provisions into practice internationally. At the state level, the output dimension includes the 
steps required to translate a regime from paper to practice. Such governmental actions involve 
steps like ratification and implementation measures. 
Outcome: The outcome dimension refers to the behavior of actors at both the international and 
the domestic level. Outcomes at the international level include compliance by important 
members. At the state level, outcomes cover activities of major agencies and actions of those 
affected by the regime's rules. 
Impact: The impact dimension includes results of the regime's operation within its own issue 
area. Such results can encompass the regime's contribution to solving the problem(s) that 
motivated the parties to create it, the regime's contribution to learning about the nature of the 
problem, or the regime's impacts on the distribution of values. 
Broader consequences: These are effects of the regime that go beyond the problem or specific 
issues it addresses. For example, such consequences encompass demonstration effects leading 
to the creation of new international regimes in other issue areas or changes in the contents or the 
priorities of the international political agenda produced by the regime. 
301 OUTPUTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
Output: At the international level, the output dimension refers to the activities involved in 
activating a regime's provisions and decisionmaking procedures (regimes bodies). After the 
negotiation and the signing of an agreement, states must take steps to put the regime's 
provisions into practice internationally. At the state level, the output dimension includes the 
steps required to translate a regime from paper to practice. Such governmental actions involve 
steps like ratification and implementation measures. 
FORM: RCl 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 301A Are the regime-wide bodies that are called for by the 
regime's constitutive agreements in operation? If so, do these regime-wide organizational 
arrangements produce authoritative decisions on a regular or as-needed basis? 
Authoritative decisions on a regular or as-needed basis are made when participants accept them 
as legitimate in the sense that they are made in conformance with the rules and procedures of 
the regime. These decisions may take the form of regulatory rules, programmatic activities, etc. 
Within CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora), there are biennial decisions about species listed in Appendices I or 11 that restrict export 
and import of the respective species. Several bodies and working groups within LRTAP (Con- 
vention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution) are responsible for overseeing the 
management of collaborative research projects under the convention. 
Provide codes for each element. 
BODIES-IN-OPERATION For each body listed under PROGRAM-ACTIVITIES, 
BODIES-PROVIDED, and EXTERNAL-BODIES, indicate 
whether the regime body is in operation. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 =Yes 
3 = Don't know 
PRODUCE- 
DECISIONS For each body listed under PROGRAM-ACTIVITIES, 
BODIES-PROVIDED, and EXTERNAL-BODIES, indicate 
whether the regime body produces authoritative decisions on 
a regular or as-needed basis? 
0 = Not applicable (Regime body is not in operation) 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes 
3 = Don't know 
PROGRAM-ACTIVITIES Programmatic activities checked or mentioned above (see 
codes above). 
BODIES-PROVIDED Decisionmaking bodies provided for in the regime listed 
above (see codes above). 
EXTERNAL-BODIES External bodies with decisionmaking power for the regime 
listed above (see codes above). 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RC2 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 301B What kinds of authoritative decisions about principles, 
norms, rules, and programmatic activities are made by the regime? 
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. The International Whaling 
Commission's new management procedures involve an authoritative decision about 
principles. 
Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations (e.g., noninter- 
ference, compliance, financial and technology transfer, assessment/amendment and 
adjustment of regime provisions, etc.). The relaxation of participation restrictions in 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings is an example of authoritative decisions about norms. 
Rules are well-defined guides for action or standards setting forth actions that members are 
expected to perform (or to refrain from performing) under appropriate circumstances. They 
include prohibitions, requirements, and permissions. Any given rule includes an indication of 
the relevant subject group, a behavioral prescription, and a specification of the circumstances 
under which the rule is operative. Under many treaty regimes regular conferences of the 
parties make authoritative decisions about rules by a) revising existing rules and developing 
new rules in the issue area, and b) making decisions about how to apply existing or newly 
developed rules in the issue area. 
Programmatic activities are substantive activities intended to support the regime's operation and 
to promote the implementation of the regime's provisions (e.g., scientific analysis, compliance 
monitoring, verification of compliance, financial and technology transfer, etc.). Under many 
treaty regimes regular conferences of the parties or other regime bodies make authoritative 
decisions about the content of programs for scientific analysis, and about measures to 
improve compliance of the parties, and on financial mechanisms or projects to support 
domestic implementation. 
Provide codes for each element. 
REGIME- 
DECISIONS What kinds of authoritative decisions are made by the 
regime? Check as many as apply. 
0 = Regime makes no authoritative decisions at all 
1 = Regime makes authoritative decisions about principles/norms 
2 = Regime makes authoritative decisions about rules 
3 = Regime makes authoritative decisions about programmatic activities 
4 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
302 MEMBER-LEVEL OUTPUTS 
FORM: RC3 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 302A Have the important members taken steps to translate the 
international commitments of the agreements into domestic obligations? 
This question applies to both legally binding and non-binding agreements. For non-binding 
agreements, members can demonstrate their commitment to the regime through formal 
statements indicating acceptance of the terms of the regime. Ratification as a formal 
requirement in the sense of international law applies only to states. For states, implementing 
legislation refers to the enactment of statutes. For non-state actors, it refers to actions like 
corporate plans, directives (e.g., EU directives), or other regulations intended to translate an 
agreement into a domestic obligation. Some states do not require implementing legislation for 
a treaty to acquire domestic legal status. It is possible to make an international obligation a 
domestic obligation through means other than formal implementing legislation (for example, 
states and non-state actors can translate international obligations through executive orders or 
voluntary agreements into domestic obligations). 
Provide codes for each element. 
AGREEMENTS Agreements identified in the precoding agreement that are 
part of the regime by name. 
IMPORTANT- 
FORMAL-MEMBERS Important formal members identified above (including 
states, international governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations). 
TRANSLATION- 
STEPS Have the important members listed under IMPORTANT- 
FORMAL_MEMBERS taken steps to translate the 
international commitments of the agreements listed under 
AGREEMENTS into domestic obligations? For each 
important formal member, check as many as apply. 
O= Not applicable 
1 = Member (only if state) ratified the agreement 
2 = Member has taken steps other than ratification to acknowledge an obligation to the 
regime within its own jurisdiction 
3 = Member passed implementing legislation (state passed law, non-state actor passed 
internally binding regulations) 
4 = Member took steps other than implementing legislation to make agreement a domestic 
obligation 
5 = Member designated administrative or non-governmental unit to be responsible for 
implementing the agreement 
6 = Agencies given responsibility in the legislation devised and promulgated more detailed 
regulations 
7 = Responsible agencies of important member initiated programs needed to give effect to 
the agreement's provisions 
8 = Member negotiated agreements with firms or other actors to implement the agreement 
9 = Member allocated funds to implement agreement domestically 
10 = Member had already passed some or all necessary implementing legislation before 
agreement was concluded 
11 = Member had already designated non-governmental unit before agreement was con- 
cluded 
12 = Agencies had already devised/promulgated detailed regulations before agreement was 
concluded 
13 = Member had already negotiated agreements with firms or other actors before agreement 
was concluded 
14 = Member had already allocated funds to implementation measures before agreement was 
concluded 
15 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RC4 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 302B In a paragraph, elaborate on the political dynamics 
involved in these outputs. 
Provide information for each element. 
PERSPECTIVES- 
NARRATIVE What were the members' perspectives on the 
implementation process and what were their motivations? 
Refer to the motivations of the members of the agreements 
and to the motivations and actions of those domestic actors 
involved with implementation. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
303 ACTOR-LEVEL OUTCOMES 
Outcome: The outcome dimension refers to the behavior of actors at both the international and 
the domestic level. Outcomes at the international level include compliance by important 
members. At the state level, outcomes cover activities of major agencies and actions of those 
affected by the regime's rules. 
FORM: RC5 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 303A Does the behavior of important actors generally conform 
with the provisions of the regime? Did the regime exert a causal influence on these 
developments? 
Provide codes for each element. 
Distinguish between regime factors and non-regime factors in assessing the regime's causal 
influence in this area. Indicate the basis for your judgment (documents, articles or books, 
interview notes, etc.). 
Actor behavior conforms with regime rules when it produces outcomes that fulfill require- 
ments, whether or not it was intentional, whether or not the actor has a legal obligation to do 
so, and whether or not the regime had a causal impact on the behavior. 
If behavior would have been the same without the regime, the regime had no causal impact. If 
the behavior of actors conformed occasionally or even frequently failed to conform with the 
regime's rules but conformity with the regime's rules would have been even worse in the 
absence of the regime, we consider the regime to have had a positive causal influence. If the 
behavior of actors conformed occasionally or frequently failed to conform with the regime's 
rules but conformity would have been even better in the absence of the regime, we consider 
the regime to have had a negative causal influence. 
Regime factors are those that stem from the regime's existence. Such factors may include 
weak or strong rules, mechanisms for technology or financial transfer, etc. that may have 
positive or negative influences on the achievement of the regime's stated goals. Non-regime 
factors are those operating outside the regime's environment but not attributable to the 
regime's existence (e.g., economic recession) that either promote or weaken the achievement 
of the regime's stated goals. 
IMPORTANT-NATION Important nationslstates identified in the precoding 
agreement. 
ALL-MEMBERS Provide a general judgement about all members of the re- 
gime. 
NONSTATE Non-state actors identified in the precoding agreement. 
CONFORMITY For each important actor listed under IMPORTANT- 
NATION, ALL-MEMBERS, or NONSTATE, indicate 
whether that actor generally conformed with the provisions 
of the regime rules. 
0 = Not applicable (e.g., actor does not need to conform with regime rules) 
1 = Behavior exceeds regime requirements: The actor conforms with the regime's rules 
almost all the time and even exceeds them to a degree that is considered significant or 
important by regime members (e.g., the behavior of a number of industrialized countries 
exceeds the rules established under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer 1987 and its revisions in 1990 and 1992). 
2 = Behavior meets regime requirements: The actor conforms with the regime's rules almost 
all the time but does not significantly exceed the regime requirements (e.g., the U.S. and the 
former Soviet Union conformed with the provisions of several bilateral agreements to reduce 
nuclear weapons but did not significantly exceed the regime requirements). 
3 = Behavior conforms with some requirements but not all: The actor only conforms with 
some of the regime rules. 
4 = Behavior conforms some (but not all) of the time and/or to some degree but not com- 
pletely: The actor conforms with the regime's rules most of the time but deviates 
occasionally in such a way that is considered significant or important by regime members 
(e.g., North Korea's behavior occasionally deviated from the provisions of the Non-Proli- 
feration Treaty) and/or conforms only to some degree in a way that is considered significant 
or important by regime members. 
5 = Behavior does not conform at all: The actor does not conform with the regime's rules to 
any significant or important degree. 
6 = Don't know 
CONFORMITY-CAUSAL For each important actor listed under INIPORTANT- 
NATION, ALL-MEMBERS, or NONSTATE, indicate 
whether the regime had a causal influence on the degree of 
conformance of the actor(s). 
0 = Not applicable (e.g., actor does not need to conform with regime rules) 
1 = Little or no causal impact: Non-regime factors mainly account for state of the world and 
regime factors do not play a role. 
2 = Modest causal influence: The regime matters with regard to the state of the world but 
non-regime factors are more important. 
3 = Large causal influence: The regime accounts equally with non-regime factors for the 
state of the world or has proven to be more important with regard to the state of the world 
than non-regime factors. 
4= Negative causal influence: The regime exerted a negative influence toward conformance 
with requirements. 
5 = Don't know 
CONFORMITY- 
CAUSAL-REFERENCE Indicate the basis for your judgment (documents, articles or 
books, interview notes, etc.) for each important actor. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RC6 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 303B What types of events and actions were significant 
elements of the processes through which the regime affected outcomes? Which of these 
processes played significant roles in the regime's causal impact? 
Provide codes for each element. 
ACTIONS-OUTCOMES What types of events and actions were significant elements 
of the processes through which the regime affected 
outcomes? Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention 
additional eventslactions. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Government policy applying to government action alone 
2 = Government policy applying to the population as a whole 
3 = Government policy applying to specific industrialleconomic sectors 
4 = Government subsidies to industry 
5 = Government policies aimed at individuals 
6 = Change in industrial goals or methods not required by government policy 
7 = Campaigns to change consumer behavior 
8 = Watchdog groups pushing for regime compliance (e.g., non-state actors like Amnesty 
International or Greenpeace pushing for compliance with human-rights or environmental 
regimes) 
9 =Don't know 
10 = If applicable, mention additional eventslactions 
ACTIONS- 
OUTCOMES-CAUSAL Which of these processes played significant roles in the 
regime's causal impact (szz codzs above)? Check as many as 
apply. If applicable, mention additional eventslactions. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RC7 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 303C Did the regime have behavioral effects that were not 
explicitly called for in its constitutive provisions? If so, please describe these effects and the 
mechanisms that caused them. 
Provide information for each element. 
NARRATIVE- 
BEHAVIORAL-EFFECTS Did the regime have behavioral effects that were not 
explicitly called for in its constitutive provisions? If so, 
please describe these effects and the mechanisms that caused 
them. For each element, elaborate. Draw on the following 
items; add additional information, if applicable. 1 = Did 
domestic political alignments in the nations change and what 
causal impact did the regime have on this change? 2 = Did 
the regime strengthen or weaken the position of actors on the 
international level (e.g., the Antarctic Treaty System had the 
effect of strengthening the position of the scientific 
community vis-A-vis other interests within most member 
states with regard to development of government policies 
toward Antarctica)? 3 = Did the regime strengthen or 
weaken the position of other actors (e.g., the GATT 
strengthened the positions of exporting and consumer 
interests). 4 = Additional information. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RC8 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 303D Has the operation of the regime directly or indirectly 
affected the behavior of various social groups of important actors (e.g., car drivers, power 
plant operators, builders of pollution abatement facilites, private firms, ethnic groups, arms 
producers)? 
Distinguish between groups that are affected negatively or positively by the operation of the 
regime. 
Positive effects can result from economic payoffs (e.g., higher turnover from higher sales of 
pollution abatement facilities, increased exports as a consequence of lower tariffs), from 
improvement of the environment (e.g., better air quality in regions with severe air pollution, 
better water quality in highly polluted rivers), from improvement of the domestic status of a 
group (e.g., protection of ethnic groups), from newly established processes of decision- 
making due to moving decisionmaking from the domestic to the international level (domestic 
groups can gain influence), etc. 
Negative effects can result from new economic strains (higher production costs, costs arising 
from investments in pollution abatement measures, decreased arms exports as a consequence 
of disarmament), from newly established processes of decisionmaking due to moving 
decisionmaking from the domestic to the international level (domestic groups can lose 
influence), etc. 
Provide codes for each element. 
SOCIAL- 
POSITIVELY-AFFECTED Mention those social groups within each of the important 
nations whose behavior is affected positively by the 
operation of the regime. 
0 = No groups affected (operation of the regime has not positively affected behavior of social 
groups within important nations - neither directly nor indirectly) 
1 = Don't know 
2 = If yes, mention those groups affected by the operation of the regime 
SOCIAL- 
NEGATIVELY-AFFECTED Mention those social groups within each of the important 
nations whose behavior is affected negatively by the 
operation of the regime. 
0 = No groups affected (operation of the regime has not negatively affected behavior of 
social groups within important nations - neither directly nor indirectly) 
1 = Don't know 
2 = If yes, mention those groups affected negatively by the operation of the regime 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RC9 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 303E Specify the important nations in which the behavior of 
these groups was especially affected. Indicate the extent to which the behavior of these 
groups was affected by the operation of the regime. 
Provide codes for each element. 
IMPORTANT-NATION Important nationslstates identified in the precoding agree- 
ment. Give a judgment for all states in the issue area as well. 
SOCIAL- 
POSITIVELY-AFFECTED Social groups within important nations whose behavior was 
positively affected by the operation of the regime. Indicate 
for each important nation listed under IMPORTANT- 
NATION, if these groups were positively affected. 
SOCIAL- 
POSITIVE-DEGREE For each group listed under SOCIAL-POSITIVELY- 
AFFECTED, indicate the extent to which the behavior of 
these groups was affected by the operation of the regime. 
Provide information separately for each important nation 
listed under IMPORTANT-NATION. 
1= Little or no positive effect: The benefits a group receives as a consequence of the regime's 
operation are only marginal. For example, economic actors experience low or no increase in 
economic turnover due to investments necessary as a consequence of the regime's operation 
(e.g., producers of pollution abatement technologies). Such a slight increase in economic 
turnover does not exceed 5 percent and does not lead to a perceptible increase in employment 
in a single industrial sector. People affected by a problem experience no or only a little 
improvement of the situation. 
2= Moderate positive effect: Compared to the situation before the regime, the regime's 
operation positively affects a group's behavior or the group benefits to some extent. For 
example, economic actors experience an increase in economic turnover due to investments as 
a consequence of the operation of the regime, and such an increase falls between 5 and 20 
percent. Such an increase in economic turnover can lead to a perceptible increase in 
employment, not exceeding 5 percent for a single affected group. People affected by a 
problem experience some improvement of the situation, although the main problem still 
exists. 
3= Major positive effect: The positive effects resulting from the operation of the regime are 
dramatic. Economic actors benefit from a strong increase in economic turnover that exceeds 
20 percent. Such an increase in economic turnover can lead to a significant increase in 
employment, exceeding 5 percent for a single affected group. People affected by a problem 
experience significant improvement of the situation. 
4 = Don't know 
SOCIAL- 
NEGATIVELY-AFFECTED Social groups within important nations whose behavior was 
negatively affected by the operation of the regime. Indicate 
for each important nation listed under IMPORTANT- 
NATION, if these groups were negatively affected. 
GROWS- 
NEGATIVE-DEGREE For each group listed under SOCIAL-NEGATIVELY- 
AFFECTED, indicate the extent to which the behavior of 
these groups was affected by the operation of the regime. 
Provide information separately for each important nation 
listed under IMPORTANT-NATION. 
1= Little or no negative effect: The adjustments to be made by a group as a consequence of 
the regime's operation are only marginal. For example, compared to its former behavior, the 
group has to make only minor investments in new technologies or consumer behavior is 
(nearly) stable. Compared to its former economic turnover in the relevant sector, it 
experienced only a minor decrease not higher than 5 per cent. For instance, car drivers or 
other interest groups experience little or no significant increase in prices, not exceeding 5 
percent (e.g., gasoline prices, taxes, investments in new technologies, etc.). New investments 
necessary as a consequence of the regime's operation do not cause additional costs higher 
than 5 percent considering long-term amortization of these investments. Such additional costs 
do not lead to a perceptible reduction in employment. People affected by the problem 
experience little or no worsening of the situation. 
2 = Moderate negative effect: Compared to former practices, the regime's operation affects a 
group's behavior to some extent. For example, investments in new technologies produce 
additional costs, and costs are higher for such technologies even if long-term amortization is 
taken into account. However, such short- or long-term costs do not exceed 20 percent 
compared with pre-regime costs. Compared to the former economic turnover in the relevant 
sector, it experienced a decrease between 5 and 20 per cent. For instance, car drivers or other 
interest groups could experience a perceptible, but still moderate, increase in costs of not 
more than 20 percent or could be required to make perceptible but not drastic behavioral 
changes (e.g., speed reduction from 130 to 110 k d h ) .  Additional costs could lead to a 
perceptible reduction in employment, not exceeding 5 percent within a single affected group. 
People affected by the problem experience some worsening of the situation. 
3 = Major negative effect: The increase of costs or other behavioral changes resulting from 
the operation of the regime are dramatic. For example, investments in new technologies 
produce significant additional costs that exceed 20 percent including long-term amortization. 
Compared to former economic turnover in the relevant sector, it experienced a major 
decrease of more than 20 per cent. Car drivers experience a significant increase in the price 
of gasoline or significant changes in speed limits. Such an increase in prices exceeds 20 
percent. A speed reduction from 130 to 90 k d h  represents a significant behavioral change as 
a direct or indirect consequence of the regime's operation. Additional costs lead to significant 
reduction in employment, exceeding 5 percent for a single affected group. People affected by 
the problem experience significant worsening of the problem. 
4 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RClO 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 303F Taken together, did the behavioral changes lead to the 
fulfillment of the stated and/or unstated goals of the regime? What causal impact did the 
regime have in producing these changes? 
Distinguish between regime factors and non-regime factors in assessing the causes of these 
developments. 
If the behavioral changes would have occurred without the regime, the regime had no causal 
impact. If the regime led to some or significant behavioral changes but behavioral changes 
would have been less likely or occurred to a more limited extent in the absence of the regime, 
we consider the regime to have had a positive causal influence. If behavioral changes would 
have been even more far-reaching in the absence of the regime, we consider the regime to 
have had a negative causal influence. 
Regime factors are factors that stem from the regime's existence. Such factors may include 
weak or strong rules, mechanisms for technology or financial transfer, etc. that may have 
positive or negative influences on the achievement of the regime's stated goals. Non-regime 
factors are those operating outside the regime's environment and may include developments 
that are not attributable to the regime's existence (e.g., economic recession) and that either 
promote or weaken the achievement of the regime's stated goals. 
Provide codes for each element. 
GOALS Stated goals of the regime mentioned above. 
GOALS-FULFILL If the regime has stated goals, indicate whether the 
behavioral changes led to the fulfillment of the stated goals 
of the regime. Provide codes for each stated goal mentioned 
under STATED-GOALS. 
0 = Not applicable (No goals) 
1 = No (Goal not fulfilled) 
2 = Yes (Goal fulfilled) 
3 = Don't know 
GOALS-FULFILL-CAUSAL For each stated goal coded under GOALS-FULFILL, 
indicate what causal impact the regime had on this develop- 
ment. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Little or no causal impact: Non-regime factors mainly account for all behavioral changes 
and regime factors do not play a role. 
2 = Modest causal influence: The regime matters with regard to behavioral changes but non- 
regime factors are more important 
3 = Large causal influence: The regime accounts equally with non-regime factors for the 
behavioral changes or has proven to be more important with regard to the behavioral changes 
than non-regime factors. 
4= Negative causal influence: The regime exerted a negative influence on behavioral changes 
affecting the fulfillment of the stated andlor unstated goals. 
5 = Don't know 
UNSTATED-GOALS Unstated goals of the regime mentioned above. 
UNSTATED- 
GOALS-FULFILL If the regime has unstated goals, indicate whether the 
behavioral changes that occurred led to the fulfillment of the 
unstated goals of the regime. Provide codes for each unstated 
goal mentioned under UNSTATED-GOALS. 
0 = Not applicable (No goals) 
1 = No (Goal not fulfilled) 
2 = Yes (Goal fulfilled) 
3 = Don't know 
UNSTATED-GOALS- 
FULFILL-CAUS AL For each unstated goal coded under GOALS-FULFILL, 
indicate what causal impact the regime had on this develop- 
ment? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Little or no causal impact: Non-regime factors mainly account for all behavioral changes 
and regime factors do not play a role. 
2 = Modest causal influence: The regime matters with regard to behavioral changes but non- 
regime factors are more important. 
3 = Large causal influence: The regime accounts equally with non-regime factors for the 
behavioral changes or has proven to be more important with regard to the behavioral changes 
than non-regime factors. 
4= Negative causal influence: The regime exerted a negative influence on behavioral changes 
affecting the fulfillment of the stated and/or unstated goals. 
5 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
304 IMPACTS OF THE REGIME IN THE TARGETED 
ISSUE AREA 
Impact: The impact dimension includes results of the regime's operation within its own issue 
area. Such results can encompass the regime's contribution to solving the problzmts) that 
motivated the parties to create it, the regime's contribution to learning about the nature of the 
problem, or the regime's impacts on the distribution of values. 
FORM: R C l l  
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 304A How did the state of the world change during this period 
with respect to the problems addressed by the regime? Did the regime exert a causal 
influence on these developments? 
Distinguish between regime factors and non-regime factors when assessing the regime's 
causal influence on these developments. Indicate the basis for your judgment (documents, 
articles or books, interview notes, etc.). 
If the actual state of affairs was somewhat negative or stayed the same but the situation 
would have been even worse in the absence of the regime, we consider the regime to have 
had a positive causal influence (e.g., after the creation of the Baltic Sea Regime, conditions 
failed to improve, but the regime helped prevent deterioration). If the actual state of affairs is 
somewhat positive but the situation would have been even better in the absence of the 
regime, we consider the regime to have had a negative causal influence. 
Regime factors are factors that stem from the regime's existence. Such factors may include 
weak or strong rules, mechanisms for technology or financial transfer, etc. that may have 
positive or negative influences on the achievement of the regime's stated goals. Non-regime 
factors operate outside the regime's environment and may include developments that are not 
attributable to the regime's existence (e.g., economic recession) and that either promote or 
weaken the achievement of the regime's stated goals. 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
PROBLEM-CHANGE For each problem listed under PROBLEM, indicate whether 
and how the state of the world changed during this period 
with respect to the problem. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = The problem worsened considerably: During this period, a considerable change occurred 
towards (further) deterioration of the problem (e.g., problem of regional arms control: strong 
one-sided armament puts an aggressive state into the role of a regional power (Nazi Germany 
in the 1930s) or produces strong arms race with neighboring states). 
2 = The problem worsened slightly: During this period, a slight change occurred towards 
(further) deterioration of the problem (e.g, problem of preventing diffusion of nuclear 
weapons: The diffusion of nuclear weapons could not be controlled and the number of 
nuclear powers increased). 
3 = The problem stayed the same 
4 = The problem improved slightly: During this period, a slight change occurred towards 
(further) improvement of the problem (e.g., problem of an independent Palestinian state: 
In the first half of the 1990s, peace talks among Israel, the Arab states, and the PLO 
produced some progress with regard to the relationships among the parties). 
5 = The problem improved considerably: During this stage, a considerable change occurred 
with regard to (further) improvement of the problem (e.g., human rights problems between 
East and West: As a consequence of the dissolution of the former Soviet Empire in Eastern 
Europe, basic human rights like freedom of speech or association are no longer conflictual 
issues between East and West). 
6 = Don't know 
PROBLEM- 
CHANGE-CAUSAL For each problem coded under PROBLEM-CHANGE, 
indicate whether the regime exerted a causal influence on the 
change of the world with regard to the problem. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Little or no causal impact: Non-regime factors mainly account for state of the world and 
regime factors do not play a role. 
2 = Modest causal influence: The regime matters with regard to the state of the world but 
non-regime factors are more important. 
3= Balanced causal influence: On balance, regime and non-regime factors account equally for 
the state of the world. 
4 = Significant causal influence: The regime has proven to be more important with regard to 
the state of the world than are non-regime factors. 
5 = Very strong causal influence: Regime factors account for virtually all these 
developments. 
6 = Don't know 
PROBLEM- 
CAUSAL-REFERENCE For each element, indicate a basis for your judgment 
(documents, articles or books, interview notes, etc.). 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RC12 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 304B Did the understanding of the nature of the problem 
change within important nations? How much of this change is attributable to the operation of 
the regime? 
The degree of uncertainty in an issue area depends on consensus regarding the nature, causes, 
and consequences of the problem and on consensus about solutions and about what should be 
maximized in the issue area (e.g., whether the actors value protecting fish resources or 
harvesting fish to provide food). 
Regime factors are those that stem from the regime's existence. Such factors may include 
new knowledge gathered through international scientific collaboration promoted by the 
regime (e.g., regime may include provisions covering scientific collaboration as in the cases 
of LRTAP or the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer). Non-regime 
factors operate outside the regime's environment and include factors not attributable to the 
regime's existence (e.g., the sudden occurrence of an ecological crisis like the depletion of 
fish stocks due to pollution from land-based sources). 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
IMPORTANT-NATION Important nationslstates identified in the precoding agree- 
ment. Provide codes for each problem listed under 
PROBLEM. Give a judgment for all states in the issue area 
as well. 
PROBLEM- 
UNDERSTAND-CHANGE Did the understanding of the nature of the problem change 
within important nations? For each problem, provide codes 
for each important nation listed under IMPORTANT- 
NATION. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Little or no change 
2 = Significant change 
3 = Don't know 
UNDERSTAND- 
CHANGE-CAUSAL How much of this change is attributable to the operation of 
the regime? For each problem, provide codes for each 
important nation listed under IMPORTANT-NATION. 
0 = Not applicable (no change occurred). 
1 = Little or no causal impact: Non-regime factors account for virtually all changes and 
regime factors do not play a role. 
2 = Modest causal influence: The regime matters with regard to changes in the understanding 
of the problem and in the understanding of opportunities for problem solving, but non-regime 
factors are more important. 
3 = Significant causal influence: The regime is more important with regard to changes in the 
understanding of the problem and in the understanding of opportunities for problem solving 
than are non-regime factors. 
4 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RC13 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 304C Did the information about the options available for 
tackling the problem change within important states? How much of this change is attributable 
to the operation of the regime? 
Options for dealing with a problem may focus on measures taken within different sectors that 
contribute to a solution of the overall problem. Options for tackling an international problem 
are based on information about the variables most important for solving the problem. 
Regime factors are those that stem from the regime's existence. Such factors may include 
new knowledge gathered through scientific collaboration promoted by the regime (e.g., the 
creation of ad hoc working groups of experts to develop options for tackling the problem), 
etc.. Non-regime factors operate outside the regime's environment and are not attributable to 
the regime's existence (e.g., availability of new technologies developed outside the regime). 
Provide codes for each element. 
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
IMPORTANT-NATION Important nationslstates identified in the precoding 
agreement. Provide codes for each problem listed under 
PROBLEM. Give a judgment for all states in the issue area 
as well. 
OPTIONS- 
PROBLEM-CHANGE Did the information about the options available for tackling 
the problem change within important states? For each 
problem, provide codes for each important nation listed 
under IMPORTANT-NATION. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = Little or no change 
2 = Significant change 
3 = Don't know 
OPTIONS-PROBLEM- 
CHANGE-CAUSAL How much of this change is attributable to the operation of 
the regime? For each problem, provide codes for each 
important nation listed under IMPORTANT-NATION. 
0 = Not applicable (no change). 
1 = Little or no causal impact: Non-regime factors account for virtually all changes and 
regime factors do not play a role. 
2 = Modest causal influence: The regime matters with regard to changes in the understanding 
of the problem and in the understanding of opportunities for problem solving, but non-regime 
factors are more important. 
3 = Significant causal influence: The regime is more important with regard to changes in 
understanding of the problem and in the understanding of opportunities for problem solving 
than are non-regime factors. 
4 = Don't know 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RC14 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 304D Did the operation of the regime lead to increases in the 
capacities of member states to participate effectively in social practices at the international 
level? If so, elaborate in a paragraph. 
A regime can increase the capacity of members to participate effectively in social practices 
by providing an institutional framework of principles, norms, rules, programs and 
decisionmaking procedures to promote cooperation in a world of anarchic states; by 
providing incentives for states to participate in international negotiations (e.g., a trust fund 
for developing countries' participation in the climate negotiations); by providing knowledge, 
technological assistance, and financial and technological transfers for those countries unable 
to comply with the regime's rules, etc. 
Provide codes for each element. 
SOCIAL-PRACTISES Did the regime lead to increases in the capacity of member 
states to participate effectively in social practices at the 
international level? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes 
3 = Don't know 
SOCIAL- 
PRACTISES-NARRATIVE If SOCIAL-PRACTISES is coded '2' (=yes), elaborate in a 
paragraph. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RCl5 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 304E How are the benefits arising from the operation of the 
regime distributed among members? In a paragraph, describe the nature of the distribution 
and identify a few illustrative states that received different benefits. 
This question refers to benefits associated with problem-solving and not to benefits arising 
from side payments, etc.. For instance, is a decrease in cases of cancer resulting from the 
operation of the regime evenly or unevenly distributed among members? Do members benefit 
evenly or unevenly from the improvement of the environment achieved as a consequence of 
the regime (e.g., thicker ozone layer, cleaner regional seas, etc.)? Do members benefit evenly 
or unevenly from disarmament? Does liberalization of trade produce the same benefits for all 
members, or do exporting countries benefit more than others? 
Provide codes for each element. 
BENEFITS-DISTRIBUTE How are the benefits arising from the operation of the 
regime distributed among members? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = More or less evenly distributed 
2 = Unevenly distributed 
3 = Don't know 
BENEFIT- 
DISTRIBUTE-NARRATIVE Describe in a paragraph the nature of the distribution and 
identify a few illustrative members that received different 
levels of benefits. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RC16 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 304F How are the costs associated with the operation of the 
regime distributed among members? In a paragraph, describe the nature of the distribution 
and identify a few illustrative states that incurred different costs. 
Costs can be material or nonmaterial. For example, one cost to countries donating to the 
Montreal Protocol Interim Fund was the precedent set by the fund for future global 
environmental agreements. Liberalization of trade can put countries with economic sectors 
not adapted to global competition at a disadvantage. 
Provide codes for each element. 
COSTS-DISTRIBUTE How are the costs associated with the operation of the 
regime distributed among members? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = More or less evenly distributed 
2 = Unevenly distributed 
3 = Don't know 
COSTS-DISTRIBUTE- 
NARRATIVE Describe in a paragraph the nature of the distribution and 
identify a few illustrative members that incurred different 
levels of costs. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RC17 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 304G Describe the relationship between the distribution of 
costs and benefits. 
Provide information for each element. 
COST-BENEFIT- 
RELATION Describe in a paragraph the relationship between the 
distribution of costs and benefits. Discuss the relationship 
between costs and benefits for a few illustrative states. Draw 
on the following items; add additional information, if 
applicable. 1 = Did members who paid the highest costs get 
the most benefit? 2 = Where members paying little costs 
given an advantage over other members paying higher costs 
in terms of benefits received from the operation of the 
regime? 3 = Additional information. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
305 BROADER CONSEQUENCES OF THE REGIME 
Broader consequences: These are effects of the regime that go beyond the problem or specific 
issues it addresses. For example, such consequences encompass demonstration effects leading 
to the creation of new international regimes in other issue areas, or changes in the contents or 
the priorities of the international political agenda produced by the regime. 
FORM: RCl8 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 305A Did the regime influence relations between members and 
non-members? If so, please describe. 
Sometimes regimes alter relations between members and non-members. For example, some 
fishery agreements help members to restrict non-member access to a resource previously 
open to access by all. The Barents Sea fishery agreement helped the USSR and Norway to 
restrict foreign access to parts of the Barents Sea. The GATT deepened the separation 
between market economies and command economies. The European Common MarketlSingle 
European Act led to increased US direct investment in Europe. 
Provide codes for each element. 
RELATIONS Did the regime influence relations between members and 
non-members? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes 
3 = Don't know 
RELATIONS- 
NARRATIVE If RELATIONS is coded '2' (=yes), elaborate in a 
paragraph. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RC19 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 305B Did the operation of the regime produce demonstration 
effects leading to the creation of new international regimes or influencing the evolution of 
existing international regimes in other issue areas? If so, please describe. 
A typical demonstration effect involves the stimulation of a new regime-building process in 
another issue area (e.g., the ozone regime stimulating the creation of a climate regime). 
Individual elements of a regime can stimulate the creation of a regime in another issue area or 
encourage the use of similar legal formulations or political mechanisms in new regimes (the 
ozone fund as an example for future funds, the framework convention/protocol approach of 
LRTAP as an example for other conventions). 
Provide codes for each element. 
DEMONSTRATION- 
EFFECTS Did the operation of the regime produce demonstration 
effects leading to the creation of new international regimes 
in other issue areas? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 =  Yes 
3 = Don't know 
DEMO-EFFECTS- 
NARRATIVE If DEMONSTRATION-EFFECTS is coded '2' (=yes), 
elaborate in a paragraph. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RC20 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 305C Has the regime changed the contents of the international 
political agenda or the priority of issues included on this agenda? 
Newly established regimes or regime-related developments can cause growing attention to 
other issues on the international political agenda. The Maastricht Treaty among the EU 
member states led to a debate about democratic participation of the European Parliament and 
about the declining influence of subnational governments and authorities. The Framework 
Convention on Climate Change raised the salience of the North-South international economic 
order. 
Provide codes for each element. 
AGENDA-CHANGE Has the regime changed the contents of the international 
political agenda or the priority of issues included on this 
agenda? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes 
3 = Don't know 
AGENDA-CHANGE- 
NARRATIVE If AGENDA-CHANGE is coded '2' (=yes), elaborate in a 
paragraph. Discuss the following items. Add additional 
information, if applicable: 1 = Did the regime lead to 
inclusion of new issues related to the regime andlor to 
neighboring issue areas on the international political agenda? 
2 = Did the regime lead to increased importance of issues 
associated with the regime or neighboring issue areas on the 
international political agenda? 3 = Did the regime lead to the 
elimination of old issues or to decreased importance of 
matters related to neighboring issue areas on the 
international political agenda? 4 = Additional information. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RC21 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 305D Has the regime affected overall relations among the 
participating states? 
Example: The partial test ban treaty was one factor among others that played a role in 
facilitating East-West dCtente. 
Provide codes for each element. 
OVERALL-RELATIONS Has the regime affected overall relations among the 
participating states? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes 
3 =Don't know 
OVERALL-RELATIONS- 
NARRATIVE If OVERALL-RELATIONS is coded '2' (=yes), elaborate 
in a paragraph. Discuss the following items. Add additional 
information, if applicable: 1 = Did the regime affect overall 
power relations? 2 = Did the regime affect the possibility of 
a security community? 3 = Did the regime affect incentives 
to cooperate in other issue areas? 4 = Additional 
information. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RC22 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 305E Has the regime affected the character of international 
society? 
The UN human rights policy and other legal documents adopted after the end of the second 
world war set global standards for human relations and contributed to the erosion of any strict 
notions of sovereignty (e.g., 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1965 International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1987 Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment). The 
creation of GATT had the consequence of generally increasing interdependencies in global 
society. 
Provide information only once for the regime as a whole. 
BROADER-EFFECTS Has the regime affected the character of international 
society? 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = N o  
2 = Yes 
3 = Don't know 
BROADER- 
EFFECTS-NARRATIVE If BROADER-EFFECTS is coded '2' (=yes), elaborate in a 
paragraph. Discuss the following items. Add additional 
information, if applicable: 1= What was the regime's 
contribution to the overall growth of international 
governance systems? 2 = What was the regime's contribution 
to increased levels of interdependence in international 
society? 3 = What was the regime's contribution to guidance 
of cooperative efforts in other issue areas? 4 = Additional 
information. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
306 NARRATIVE 
FORM: RC23 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 306A Write a short description of the central aspects of the 
regime consequences. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it help- 
ful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded above. List the most important 
literature used in coding the regime consequences part of the data protocol. 
Provide information for each element. 
CONSEQUENCES- 
NARRATIVE Write a short description of the central aspects of the regime 
consequences. It is acceptable to repeat information coded 
above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include 
information not coded above. 
CONSEQUENCES- 
LITERATURE List the most important literature used in coding the regime 
consequences part of the data protocol (If possible, indicate 
author(s), editors(s), book title, article, and year). 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
PART IV 
Regime Dynamics 
PART IV - TABLE OF CONTENTS 
401 CHANGES IN CONNECTION WITH WATERSHEDS 
401.4 If a watershed occurred, what kinds of changes did it involve? Indicate what caused the change to 
occur. 
402 DYNAMIC PATTERNS AT THE OVERALL LEVEL 
402A Did any challenges to the survival of the regime occur? 
402B Describe the dynamic patterns at the overall level of the regime. What causes of these dynamic 
patterns at the overall level are identifiable? 
402C Did the ability of the regime to cope with the problem(s) it addresses increase or decrease over 
time? 
403 NARRATIVE 
403A Write a short description of the central aspects of the regime dynamics. It is acceptable to repeat 
information coded above if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include information not coded 
above. List the most important literature used in coding the regime dynamics part of the data protocol. 
Introduction - Part IV 
This section covers changes associated with watersheds identified in the precoding 
agreement. A watershed, in contrast to a transition from one regime to another, marks a major 
change within a regime and divides the regime into distinct time periods. A watershed occurs 
if there is (i) a temporal discontinuity in the operation of the regime, or (ii) a significant 
restructuring of principleskey norms (the new principles need not necessarily be at odds with 
the old ones), or (iii) a significant change in the composition of the group of leading actors, 
or (iv) a significant expansion in functional scope (e.g. a radical deepening of regulative 
rules). 
401 CHANGES IN CONNECTION WITH WATERSHEDS 
FORM: RD1 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 401A If a watershed occurred, what kinds of changes did it 
involve? Indicate what caused the change to occur. 
Provide codes for each watershed identified in the precoding agreement. 
WATERSHED Watershed(s) identified in the precoding agreement. 
WATERSHED-CHANGE Which of the following institutional or behavioral 
phenomena changed in connection with a watershed? Check 
as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional 
institutional or behavioral phenomena that changed in 
connection with a watershed. Provide codes for each 
watershed mentioned under WATERSHED. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = No change occurred 
2 = Functional scope of the regime rules 
3 = Density or specificity of the regime rules 
4 = Programmatic activities of the regime 
5 = Compliance mechanisms of the regime 
6 = Mechanisms for funding the regime's programmatic activities 
7 = Decision-rules of the regime 
8 = Decisionmaking bodies of the regime 
9 = Composition of membership of formal regime members 
10 = Composition of membership of informal regime members 
1 1 = Formal members taking requirements seriously 
12 = Informal members taking requirements seriously 
13 = Formal members incorporating regime provisions into standard operating procedures 
14 = Informal members incorporating regime provisions into standard operating procedures 
15= If applicable, mention additional institutional or behavioral phenomena 
16 = Don't know 
CHANGE- 
INCREASE-DECREASE Indicate for each answer listed under 
WATERSHED-CHANGE what kind of change occurred 
within a watershed. 
1 = There was an increase 
2 = There was a decrease 
3 = Don't know 
WATERSHED- 
CHANGE-CAUSAL For each answer provided under WATERSHED-CHANGE, 
describe what caused the change to occur. Draw on the 
following items; add additional information, if applicable.l= 
Change in the nature of the problem, 2 = Cognitive change 
(e.g., change in availability of knowledge about causes and 
consequences of the problem, change in availability of ideas 
about managing the problem), 3 = Shifts in interests of 
leading actors, 4 = Change in distribution of power among 
important actors, 5 = Economic change (e.g., economic 
crisis, improving economic environment, economic growth), 
6 = Technological change (e.g., development/availability of 
new technologies), 7 = Changed incentives arising from 
success at initial regime operation, 8 = If applicable, 
mention additional causes. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
402 DYNAMIC PATTERNS AT THE OVERALL LEVEL 
FORM: RD2 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 402A Did any challenges to the survival of the regime occur? 
This question asks for a judgment about the regime as a whole. 
Major challenges to the survival of the regime can arise from developments in the issue area 
of the regime (e.g., noncompliance of parties, new technologies, redefinition of state 
interests, new knowledge, military conflict between members of a security regime, etc.) or 
from developments outside the issue area (e.g., economic recession, military conflict among 
members of economic, environmental, or human-rights regimes). 
THREAT Did any challenges to the survival of the regime occur? 
Check as many as apply. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = There were no challenges that threatened the regime 
2 = There were challenges in the issue area that threatened the regime, which the regime 
coped with effectively 
3 = There were challenges in the issue area that threatened the regime, which the regime was 
unable to cope with effectively 
4 = There were challenges outside the issue area that threatened the regime 
5 = Don't know 
THREAT-NARRATIVE If THREATS is coded '2' (= There were challenges in the 
issue area that threatened the regime, which the regime 
coped with effectively), '3' (= There were challenges in the 
issue area that threatened the regime, which the regime was 
unable to cope with effectively), or '4' (= There were 
challenges outside the issue area that threatened the regime), 
indicate the nature of the challenges threatening the regime. 
Elaborate in a paragraph. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RD3 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 402B Describe the dynamic patterns at the overall level of the 
regime. What causes of these dynamic patterns at the overall level are identifiable? 
This question asks for a judgment about the regime as a whole. 
OVERALL-CHANGE Which of the following institutional or behavioral 
phenomena changed at the overall level of the regime? 
Check as many as apply. If applicable, mention additional 
institutional or behavioral phenomena that changed at the 
overall level of the regime. 
0 = Not applicable 
1 = No change occurred 
2 = Functional scope of the regime rules 
3 = Density or specificity of the regime rules 
4 = Programmatic activities of the regime 
5 = Compliance mechanisms of the regime 
6 = Mechanisms for funding the regime's programmatic activities 
7 = Decision-rules of the regime 
8 = Decisionmaking bodies of the regime 
9 = Composition of membership of formal regime members 
10 = Composition of membership of informal regime members 
11 = Formal members taking requirements seriously 
12 = Informal members taking requirements seriously 
13 = Formal members incorporating regime provisions into standard operating procedures 
14 = Informal members incorporating regime provisions into standard operating procedures 
15= If applicable, mention additional institutional or behavioral phenomena 
16 = Don't know 
OVERALL- 
INCREASE-DECREASE Indicate for each answer provided under OVERALL- 
INCREASE-DECREASE what kind of change occurred at 
the overall level of the regime. 
1 = There was an increase 
2 = There was a decrease 
3 = Don't know 
OVERALL-CHANGE- 
CAUSES For each answer provided under OVERALL-CHANGE, 
describe what caused the change to occur. Draw on the 
following items; add additional information, if applicable.l= 
Change in the nature of the problem, 2 = Cognitive change 
(e.g., change in availability of knowledge about causes and 
consequences of the problem, change in availability of ideas 
about managing the problem), 3 = Shifts in interests of 
leading actors, 4 = Change in distribution of power among 
important actors, 5 = Economic change (e.g., economic 
crisis, improving economic environment, economic growth), 
6 = Technological change (e.g., development/availability of 
new technologies), 7 = Changed incentives arising from 
success at initial regime operation, 8 = If applicable, 
mention additional causes. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
FORM: RD4 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 402C Did the ability of the regime to cope with the problem(s) 
it addresses increase or decrease over time? 
This question asks for a judgment about the regime as a whole. 
OVERALL- 
PROBLEM-NARRATIVE Did the ability of the regime to cope with the problem(s) it 
addresses increase or decrease over time? Elaborate in a 
paragraph. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
403 NARRATIVE 
FORM: RD5 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 403A Write a short description of the central aspects of the 
regime dynamics. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above if you find it helpful. It 
is also appropriate to include information not coded above. List the most important literature 
used in coding the regime dynamics part of the data protocol. 
DYNAMICS-NARRATIVE Write a short description of the central aspects of the regime 
dynamics. It is acceptable to repeat information coded above 
if you find it helpful. It is also appropriate to include 
information not coded above. 
DYNAMICS-LITERATURE List the most important literature used in coding the regime 
dynamics part of the protocol (If applicable, indicate 
author(s), editor(s), book title, article, and year). 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
